

SEABASING PUBLIC INFORMATION RESOURCE GUIDE
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USMC Seabasing Public Information Resource Guide

Section 1 - Orientation

Intent and Scope

Intent of this document is to provide an information resource to enable USMC representatives to communicate some of the more important past, present and future aspects of Seabasing.

The lead for development and management of this plan is G3/G5 CD&I and PAO at Quantico, VA; (703) 432-8268 DSN (278). For more information on this plan and other Seabasing resources go to <http://www.quantico.usmc.mil/seabasing/EW/index.htm>

Given the responsibility to flatten communications and insure those who need information are getting it coupled with the diverse stakeholders and the long term challenge of informing operational paradigms and programmatic, this plan is intended to address near term (FY08-FY10), mid-term (FY10-FY15), and long-term (FY15-FY25) issues.

Situation

Given current trends and expert analysis of future requirements and capabilities, there are well documented concerns that the United States will not have the capability and capacity to adequately meet the national security demands of the future with the current 30 year amphibious shipbuilding plan. Current guidance and concerns expressed in national level and military strategy documents directly and indirectly calls for a Seabasing type capability as joint and multinational enabling concept to efficiently meet our national security objectives.

Due to misperceptions and a simple lack of education about the nature, capabilities and vision of Joint Seabasing, key stakeholders in the national security environment may not have available information on how Seabasing can effectively enable a wide range of operations. Through formal and informal feedback, many misperceptions of Seabasing as a Joint, Multinational and Interagency enabling capability, and its associated requirements, still exist.

Since the early 1990s, the Navy-Marine Corps team has worked to further develop the Seabasing concept to meet the underlying premise of U.S. sea power achieving and fully benefiting from command of the seas. This new premise focuses on proactively leveraging the asymmetric advantage we currently enjoy; using the sea as maneuver space to overcome basing and access challenges, in order to selectively project focused power and influence.

Responsibility

It is our responsibility to ensure government leaders and taxpayers understand the full capability of the Joint Seabasing concept and capabilities. It is up to them to decide how to act on that information.

Objectives

Enable USMC representatives to identify audiences that may benefit from Seabasing information then share credible, relevant, user-friendly, objective information in a timely manner to enable knowledgeable Seabasing decisions.

Reemphasize internal amphibious convictions and empower all Marine Corps stakeholders to engage in Seabasing discussions from a position of authoritative knowledge.

Audiences:

Our initial audience is internal; if we are not informed internally, we will not be able to communicate effectively to external audiences. The best external communications naturally emanates from well-founded internal understanding. It is important all audiences understand varying degrees of Seabasing however the following audiences will be a focus of effort:

- 1) MARFORs
- 2) Deputy Commandants and their staffs
- 3) TECOM and Service Schools
- 4) LOGCOM
- 5) MEFs and MSCs

The external audience that may find this information of value is comprised of those individuals and organizations who are involved with making programmatic and budgetary decisions or shaping the debate with regard to research, development, acquisition and employment of defense capabilities. A secondary external audience is those who contribute to the grass roots support for these decisions and debates.

The following six distinct external audience groups have been identified as most relevant to Seabasing issues:

- 1) Navy
- 2) DOD (e.g. OSD, COCOMs, NDU)
- 3) Lawmakers
- 4) National Security and Defense Industry Opinion Shapers
- 5) Multi-National
- 6) Retired/former Marines and friends of the Corps

Communication Approach (suggestions on ways to share information contained in this document):

Put the audience first by better understanding their role, concerns and perspectives before sharing our perspective and messages.

Provide accurate, credible, user-friendly, objective information with tangible evidence your audience finds relevant and directly addresses their needs.

Ensure we are internally educated with the basic concepts of the Long War and Seabasing then look for opportunities to connect Seabasing themes to organizational and local events.

Empower all Marines to tell the Seabasing story with a specific focus on people who have the ability to reach identified audiences.

Explain how the Seabasing concept and capabilities meet combatant commander expressed requirements and expected future security challenges – as opposed to focusing on the budgeting process and shipbuilding specifics.

Define the national defense gaps (and interagency and multi-national gaps) in a conceptual, operational and tactical way and explain how Seabasing can help to fill those gaps and mitigate the access challenges of the future

Define the increases in Irregular Warfare requirements set against the decreases in US basing options around the globe and the declining political acceptance of American military boots on the ground in order to illustrate how Seabasing is versatile and cost-effective means to utilize a wide range of military and diplomatic capability

Define current capability and what we think is needed with regard to the 30 year shipbuilding plan mix and timing. It is our responsibility to define exactly what we think is necessary for defense of our nation in the future so decision makers can work with actionable information.

Define how Seabasing fits in all of national defense with cost benefit value set against the backdrop of the whole of defense (JCIDS acquisition) or other service programmatic issues. Use the Maritime Strategy's focus on global maritime partnerships to highlight the considerable multinational benefits of more rapidly developing an ability to close and "tailor" multinational forces at sea.

Consistently look for and recommend opportunities to integrate Seabasing themes or tasks during experimentation and exercises in order to support a more informed spiral development of Seabasing capabilities. Particularly, how Seabasing supports operations on the lower end of the Range Of Military Operations (ROMO).

Continue to build partnerships with Interagency and Multi-national partners.

Strengthen relationships and attend more events with audiences that may find this information useful in order to communicate more effectively.

Section 2 – Elevator Speech, Themes and Talking Points

The Seabasing Short Story

There has been a significant reduction in overseas bases and basing rights in the last 25 years due to economics and declining political acceptance of US military boots on the ground. This has resulted in a "transformation" for the US military, changing from a forward based military to a CONUS projected, expeditionary force.

The challenge with this basing reality is the widely-shared view in our national security and defense strategies that in order to reduce the ability of extremists to attack our interests at home and abroad we must prevent them from gaining a foothold in other countries. We must be there to assist countries without maintaining a large presence ashore while integrating and applying a combination of our national capabilities with those of international partners.

Fortunately, the United States possesses an advantage not yet fully realized: Seabasing. However, the Seabasing capability currently resident in the Navy-Marine Corps team is not sufficient to support large scale joint operations of extended duration and is dependent upon secure ports and airfields ashore.

To realize this vision we must develop cargo transfer, handling and stowage technologies into our new ships and develop high speed craft and connector capabilities. A new connector capability ship, the Mobile Landing Platform, will be a key enabler.

Seabasing will allow for Joint, Interagency and Multinational persistent forward presence which will help preserve global freedom of action, strengthen existing and emerging alliances, and better protect our national interests.

Seabasing THEMES and associated Talking Points:

Seabasing has a long HISTORY of NATIONAL IMPORTANCE.

- History has proven that we cannot narrowly define the conditions for which our military must be ready because if we do, we put the nation at risk.
- By the end of World War II the United States possessed 2,547 amphibious ships comprising 37.6% of the fleet. This amphibious force could deliver an attack from the sea by 13 divisions without reliance on forward land bases. The U.S. Navy led the world in Seabasing techniques. This massive WWII fleet did not have the ability to conduct at-sea transfer, did not enjoy automated cargo handling, and could not conduct operations from over the horizon. All these

capabilities are now critical today due to threat profiles and the requirement for speed of execution.

- During the Cold War, the United States was faced with the need to rapidly reinforce forward-based forces, and blessed with the advantage of secure ports and airfields overseas, the United States invested in strategic sealift vice amphibious and mobile base capabilities.
- With the end of the Cold War, our national security strategy shifted from one of containment to one of regionally focused US forward presence.
- Since the early 1990s, the Navy-Marine Corps team has reemphasized pursuit of a true Seabasing concept and changed the underlying premise of U.S. sea power from achieving command of the seas to using and taking advantage of our command of the seas.
- This new operational concept responds to national security guidance and focuses on proactively leveraging our command of the sea; using the sea as maneuver space to overcome basing and access challenges and selectively project focused power and influence.
- There is an extensive body of officially approved Seabasing work that includes an approved Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) and a Seabasing Joint Capabilities Document (JCD). Recent assessments by the Government Accounting Office (GAO), the Defense Science Board (DSB), and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) clearly point to the need to take the Seabasing operational concept further with the establishment of a Joint Project Office of some type.
- The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) recognizes the importance of sufficient Seabasing capability and has commissioned a joint Seabasing Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA), lead by the Joint Staff J8, to identify gaps in current Seabasing capability and propose solutions. This work will conclude in December 2009.

Seabasing provides an answer to many STRATEGIC CHALLENGES.

- Seabasing mitigates many of the security challenges posed by the globalized 21st Century world. These include the need to counter extremist ideology, piracy, drug and human trafficking and the challenges to access posed by geographic, political, and military factors.

- Given these strategic conditions, the requirement for maritime forces to project U.S. power and influence has increased — and will continue to increase.
- Geographic combatant commanders are increasingly requesting the type of agile, flexible, tailored expeditionary forces that are envisioned within the Seabasing operational concept.
- Sea based forces can quickly reach key areas of the globe in spite of reduced basing rights, political opposition to U.S. “boots on the grounds,” and other impediments to basing ashore.
- “If we’re going to be able to prevent having to send thousands of troops, we need to be able to get folks [into countries at risk of conflict]... to be able to help with judiciary systems, be able to help with engineering, be able to help with electricity and the like, before a country devolves into a state where the terrorists can find a home.” -- General Peter Pace, CJCS, Feb 6, 2007, in front of the SASC

The DEFINITION of the SEABASING concept has many implications.

- **Seabasing is** both an operational mind set and an enabling concept. The current **definition of Seabasing** is found in the Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) and defines joint Seabasing as “the capability that permits flexible, rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). These capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea.”
- **Seabasing is** a concept that provides a solution to the challenge of conducting Joint, Multinational, and Interagency missions across a range of operations from the sea, across the littorals, and ashore.
- **Seabasing is** characterized by an interdependent and interconnected system of systems that includes everything from major combatants to inshore patrol craft, surface and aerial connectors to cargo handling gear, and command suites to medical centers.
- **Seabasing is** a complementary component to the larger system of main operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations in a given theater. As the only maneuverable component of this theater system, it enables us to overcome challenges to access and better support proactive engagement, crisis response, deterrence and, when necessary, warfighting. While it does not replace our need for all overseas bases, Seabasing does reduce the requirement for ports and airfields in the area of operations.

- **Seabasing is** a national imperative, brought about by reduction in land bases, increased impediments to basing ashore in many regions, and an increased requirement for flexible, capable, widely-competent forces with the ability to “wage peace” as capably as they can “wage war.” Seabasing will allow for use of the world’s oceans as bases for operations without dependence on port or airfields ashore. Such a capability recognizes that the US bases and airfields around the world are in decline and that nations are increasingly placing restrictions on or denying the use of their facilities. As a concept, Seabasing includes all kinds of platforms, including amphibious ships, MPF(F), JHSVs, and other ships and connectors as required by any given mission.

Seabasing’s considerable ADVANTAGES make it an important national investment.

- **Strategic Advantage.** Our control of the sea enables us to use it as a vast maneuver space — 365 days a year. Seabasing allows us to project influence and expeditionary power in the face of mounting access challenges. These capabilities allow maritime forces to support our partners and to deter and defeat adversaries in a complex and uncertain future.
- **Applicability across the ROMO.** Seabasing provides a capability that is as important for national security during steady state operations as they are during contingency operations that require a surge of US force presence outside of planned unit deployments. Furthermore, the lessons learned and capabilities developed during steady state operations will prove invaluable when contingency operations stress the force and require rapid aggregation of naval assets to respond to a crisis.
- **Access and Influence.** Seabasing allows us to conduct a broad range of operations in areas where access is challenged, without relying on secure ports and airfields. Due to increasing diplomatic, geographic, infrastructure, and threat limitations, Seabasing is critical to overcoming area denial and anti-access challenges in uncertain or openly hostile situations.
- **Tailored Footprint.** Seabasing enables the US and our partners to “step lightly” on local sensitivities by tailoring force and capability packages to meet only the need and desire of host nation governments and militaries.
- **Persistent Influence but Temporary Presence.** Seabasing enables US joint forces to develop international partnerships without permanent bases ashore— bases that often create unintended political, social and economic consequences. In a future of competing strategic narratives, Seabasing enables US and allied governments to project only the focused capabilities desired to influence prioritized and relevant populations.

- **Port and Airfield Afloat.** The combination of capabilities that allows us to close and assemble forces at sea (port and airfield afloat) enables us to influence events ashore from over the horizon — amphibious warfare ships, Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships, Joint High Speed Vessels, MV-22s, Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles and other surface connectors and enablers, play a key role in surmounting access challenges.
- **Enhanced Force Protection.** Weapons proliferation among both state and non-state actors has created an environment where access to ports and airfields outside of the US will be challenged—not just during forcible entry operations but during more benign non combat operations. Seabasing’s inherent force protection capability eases the political sensitivities of coalition partners and increases likelihood of participation in coalition operations.
- **Reducing Host Nation Sensitivities.** Seabasing permits us to tailor the force ashore, with a potential reduction in host nation sensitivities and concerns. The Seabasing concept enables joint and multinational forces to close, assemble and sustain forces at sea at a distance from most current threat systems. The Seabasing concept includes all the Naval force protection platforms and systems to ensure elements of the Seabase are protected from threats above, on, and under the sea.
- **Port and Airfield Afloat** Not only does a port and airfield afloat enable the rapid transition of combat forces and sustainment ashore, but Seabasing also allows for the rapid reconstitution of forces, equipment and sustainment for follow on amphibious operations.
- **Flexibility and Scalability.** Seabasing is enabled and enhanced by the characteristics of amphibious ships. Their command and control suites, flight decks, well decks, air and surface connectors, medical facilities, messing and berthing capacity, and survivability merged with the multi-capable nature of embarked Marines, make them multi-mission platforms for day to day security cooperation activities or contingency operations ranging from humanitarian assistance, security cooperation, and disaster relief to MCO and forcible entry.
- **Maritime Domain Awareness.** The Seabasing concept supports the requirements listed in the new Maritime Strategy for increased maritime intelligence and security. By increasing the number and types of forces, platforms, and systems.
- **Key Capabilities.** The sea base provides a unique platform to stage, assemble, employ and sustain forces ashore. The size of the joint / multinational force that ultimately can be deployed and sustained by the Joint sea base is largely dependent on the number and capability of the following attributes:

- **Selective off-load:** The ability to selectively retrieve and deliver specific items or equipment from a ship's hold is essential. Current sea lift is densely packed and needs to be completely unpacked before it can be used, driving the requirement for MPF (F).
- **Total Asset visibility:** Real-time knowledge of what is or is not available by having the ability to track, store, and retrieve items. Asset visibility is complementary to selective offload. Asset visibility is already in use by many commercial firms.
- **Connecting Platforms:** The sea base needs platforms such as the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) to serve as the transfer point between cargo hold and surface and air connectors.
- **Connectors:** Robust (capabilities and quantities) surface and air connectors are necessary to deploy and sustain forces. These connectors currently include platforms such as the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), Landing Craft Utility (LCU), V-22 Osprey, and CH-53 Sea Stallion. Future additions like the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) and the Joint Multi-mission Assault Craft (JMAC) will further increase our connector capabilities.
- **Joint, multinational and interagency operations.** As envisioned, Seabasing will be able to support the Army, Air Force, Special Ops, multinational forces, and the interagency through command and control, maneuver, strike, logistics, intelligence, and force protection capabilities.
 - Seabasing has the potential to support Army light brigade expeditionary operations as well as serving as a protected throughput and sustainment hub for follow-on Army force projection and support.
 - While interoperability (Army helicopters and preposition ship ramps/cranes) and maintenance concerns currently exist for full Army integration, a more robust joint Seabasing experimentation program will mitigate those concerns.
 - While the US Air Force does not perceive much gain from the future vision of Seabasing, a considerable part of their fuel and expeditionary airfield support can and will come from the sea base. The ISR and strategic lift capabilities that the Air Force brings to joint operations are key enablers to realizing the full potential of joint Seabasing.
 - Seabasing provides SOF teams the ability to use the sea as maneuver space and a protected base of operations not accessible by most observers or threats. The sea base is also an enabler for Irregular Warfare (IW) campaigns in which SOF have a central role.

- **Whole of Government.** A sea-based joint force provides the U.S. Chief of Mission a flexible tool to either increase or decrease the US presence in a region and it provides him a protected, mobile planning location to integrate DoD and Interagency operations and intelligence planners to bring a “whole of government” capability to bear without triggering host nation sensitivities over a large U.S. presence.
- **Multinational Partnerships.** Seabasing provides an optimal opportunity for our allies and multinational partners to participate in operations when they might be hesitant, for political reasons, to commit forces ashore or not have the ships to conduct sustained operations at sea and ashore. With further work to ensure interoperability, the at-sea transfer capabilities of the MPF(F) can be shared with our allies to enable them to receive forces at sea and task organize them with equipment arriving on their own leased or pre-positioned equipment ships. This is a significant “force multiplying” aspect of the Seabasing concept and capabilities.
 - Seabasing’s utility across the full range of operations is acknowledged by our multinational partners. The extent to which our allies have examined Seabasing is, in part, represented by the fact that NATO and Germany recently released their own Seabasing joint operational concepts.

The national capacity of SEABASING’S KEY COMPONENTS: amphibious ships, propositioning ships, and connectors, is important to realize Seabasing’s full potential.

Seabasing Capabilities, Programs and Concepts Overview

- Future programmatic support for Joint Seabasing and MPF(F) by all the Services, the Joint Staff, OSD, and Congress is vital to our national security.
- Seabasing is a national capability for global force projection. This concept breaks down the traditional sea-land barrier and maximizes the effect of forward presence. Recognized as a key future joint military capability, Seabasing assures joint access by leveraging the operational maneuver of forces on the sea and by reducing dependence upon fixed and vulnerable land bases.
- Seabasing is also a present capability that can be tailored and scaled to meet a broad range of requirements. As demonstrated by the Navy/Marine Corps response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Seabasing is a relevant and adaptive capability. The Navy had almost thirty ships on station at the height of Katrina relief operations and over 3,000 Seabees deployed to the Gulf Coast, making this the largest peacetime deployment of Seabees in history. In short, Seabasing represents both a future concept and a present such as disaster relief following the Asian tsunami in December 2004.

- In addition to existing amphibious warfare ships, the following programs will support the Marine Corps and are in early stages of capability development and acquisition:
 - Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)): Incremental acquisition, Capability Development Document (CDD) for increment one (MLP/T-AKE) approved; projected fielding of 1st squadron in Fiscal Year 2022.
 - Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV): Contract award is projected for FY08; subsequent awards are planned for FY09 thru FY11 with delivery of the first JHSV (Army) scheduled for FY10.
 - Ship-to-Shore Connector (SSC): Milestone A achieved, Capability Development Document is being developed; projected fielding in Fiscal Year 2015.

- Joint Seabasing is achieved through the integration of Seabasing-related concepts and capabilities, assuring access and rapid response to crises across the full range of military operations. The following joint concepts and initiatives will support Seabasing:
 - The Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept: Approved by JCS in August 2005 and provides joint context for the employment of Seabasing systems.
 - USMC's Ship to Objective Maneuver and Distributed Operations.
 - USN's Seapower-21 pillars of Sea Shaping (emerging new SP-21 pillar), Sea Base, Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and ForceNet.
 - Army's Strategic Flotilla and Operational Maneuver from Strategic Distances.
 - USAF's Global Strike, Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force, Persistent ISR, and Global Mobility.
 - Coalition Forces' expeditionary platforms and seabased C2 and sustainment.

Amphibious Shipbuilding Requirements

The Marine Corps' forcible entry requirement is a single, simultaneously-employed two Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault capability. One MEB requires seventeen amphibious warfare ships; however, given fiscal constraints, the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to assume risk by only using fifteen ships to embark the MEB Assault Echelon (AE). Historical amphibious ship availability rates dictate a minimum of eleven ships of each of the current types of amphibious ship (11/11/11 or thirty-three total ships) to provide thirty operationally available ships. In that Battle Force, ten aviation-capable big deck ships (LHA/LHD/LHA(R)) are required to accommodate the MEB's aviation combat element.

Amphibious Shipbuilding Requirements Key Points

- Amphibious Warfare Ships planned during the FYDP:

Table 2. FY 2008-2013 Shipbuilding Budget (TY08 \$M) ¹

<u>Ship Type</u>	<u>Near Term FY2007 Plan and FYDP TY</u>					<u>Total FY (08-13) \$M/Qty</u>
	<u>FY08</u>	<u>FY08</u>	<u>FY09</u>	<u>FY10</u>	<u>FY11</u>	
LPD 17	1,399/1	*1,518	*139			1,502/1
LHAR	1,377	*1,365	*0	*13.6	*22	1,377

* Program Budget Information System data current 15 January 2008

- The 2.0 MEB AE requirement is based on current Strategic Planning Guidance to “...consider capability alternatives...to support a single two Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) forcible entry operation.”
- The baseline MEB is the planning metric for shipbuilding requirements, and was validated as such in MROC DM 08-2007. It also serves as the departure point for tailoring future MEBs for amphibious assault and Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) employment. Our ongoing studies and analysis clearly revealed that we will need MLPs and LMSRs able to interoperate and transfer personnel and equipment in sea state three conditions. We also know that we will need TAK-E dry cargo ships and legacy platforms to pre-position necessary sustainment across key classes of supply.

LPD-17 Program

¹ Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2008



The Navy has commissioned two of nine programmed LPD-17 Class Ships, the USS SAN ANTONIO (LPD-17) and the USS NEW ORLEANS (LPD-18). The Marine Corps warfighting requirement for forcible entry amphibious shipping is the ability to lift the assault echelon of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades. One aspect of amphibious lift--vehicle stowage space--remains the most difficult to fulfill. LPD-17 provides an additional 13,000 square feet of vehicle stowage space over LPD-4 that will help mitigate further loss of vehicle stowage space with LHA class replacements.


LPD-17 Key Points

- PB05 identified procurement of 12 LPD-17 class ships to be a critical factor in meeting the USMC MEB Assault Echelon lift requirement. In August 2004, the Navy submitted its POM06 proposal identifying a reduction from a 12 to 10 ship buy.
- In December 2004, OSD cut the program further from 10 to 9 ships. At that time, CMC publicly stated his position that the Marine Corps would be better served with a minimum of 10 LPD-17 Class ships are currently in shipbuilding plan. As of May

2008, the 10th LPD-17 ship is not in the Draft PR-09 shipbuilding plan, but is #2 on CNO's unfunded priority list, and #1 on CMC's unfunded priority list.

- LPD-17 is designed to replace four classes of legacy amphibious ships (LKA, LST, LPD-4, and LSD36), all but one of which (LPD-4 Class) already been decommissioned (40 total).
- The ship's warfighting capabilities, which include a state-of-the-art command and control suite, substantially increased landing force vehicle lift capability, a large flight deck, and advanced ship survivability features, enhance the capability to operate in the littoral environment and make her indispensable to the Navy-Marine Corps team.
- USS SAN ANTONIO (LPD-17) was commissioned unfinished to the Navy in July 2005 and homeported in Norfolk, VA. As the "first in class" USS SAN ANTONIO has experienced some challenges as evidenced by the Mar 07 "INSURV" inspections by the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey. As a result of additional maintenance requirements identified during the INSURV inspection conducted in conjunction with Final Contractor Trials, Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL) originally scheduled for summer 2007 commenced in early 2008 and is expected to be completed in Oct-Nov 2008. USS SAN ANTONIO is scheduled for a MEU / ESG deployment in 200?.
- USS NEW ORLEANS (LPD-18) was commissioned on 10 Mar 2007.
- USS MESA VERDE (LPD-19) was commissioned on 15 Dec 2007.
- USS GREEN BAY (LPD-20) was commissioned on 15 Jul 2006.
- USS NEW YORK (LPD_21) was commissioned on 1 Mar 2008.
- 4 additional LPD-17 class ships will be constructed with a potential 10th and 11th LPD-17 being added to the long term ship building strategy.

LHA (R) Program



Amphibious Assault Ship (Replacement) (LHA(R)). The legacy *Tarawa* class amphibious assault ships reach the end of their service life during 2011-2015. The eighth *Wasp* class LHD (multi-purpose amphibious assault ship) is under construction and will replace one *Tarawa* class ship during Fiscal Year 2008. To meet future warfighting requirements and fully capitalize on the capabilities of the MV-22 and Joint Strike Fighter, two LHA(R) class ships with enhanced aviation capabilities will replace the remaining LHA class ships. These ships will provide enhanced hangar and maintenance spaces to support aviation maintenance and increased jet fuel storage and aviation ordnance magazines. We are investigating the feasibility of incorporating the reduced island concept and well-deck capabilities in future, general-purpose assault ship construction.

Marine Prepositioning Force (Future) Program



MPF(F) Squadron Composition



2 T-LHA



Length: 844 ft	Beam: 106 ft	Draft: 28.2 ft	Displacement: 45K LT
Per Sqd: 2	Speed: ~20 knots		Range -9,500 nm
Crew: 285	Stand Det: 23	MAGTF: 1,490	NSE: ~590 Berths: 3, 052
A/C Stow: 55	A/C Op Spots: 9	JP-5: 1.6 Mil gal	Water: 400k Gal/200K gal Per day
Sqft: 11,600	CuFt: 160, 000		Well Deck: N/A
TEU: N/A	Med: 2 OR & 24 Beds-4 OR&16/45		Stern Ramp: N/A

3 MLP

Artist Rendition/Notional Configuration
FLO/FLO Technology focused



Length: TBD	Beam: TBD	Draft: TBD	Displacement: TBD
Per Sqd: 3	Speed: ~20 knots		Range -9,500 nm
Crew: 64	Stand Det: 10	MAGTF: 594	NSE: ~128 Berths: ~1,458
A/C Stow: 0	A/C Op Spots: 1	JP-5: ~1.2 Mil gal	Water: ~168K Gal/TBD gal Per day
Sqft: ~11,253	CuFt: ~935		Mission Deck: 6 (LCAC)
TEU: N/A	Med: Sick Call		Stern Ramp: N/A

1 T-LHD



Length: 844 ft	Beam: 106 ft	Draft: 27 ft	Displacement: 42K LT
Per Sqd: 1	Speed: ~20 knots		Range -9,500 nm
Crew: 285	Stand Det: 23	MAGTF: 1,656	NSE: ~670 Berths: 2,946
A/C Stow: 42	A/C Op Spots: 9	JP-5: 607 K gal	Water: 400K Gal/200K Gal Per Day
Sqft: 24, 012	CuFt: 145, 000		Well Deck: 3 LCAC
TEU: N/A	Med: 6 OR & 60 Beds		Stern Ramp: 72 ST

3 T-AKE



Length: 689 ft	Beam: 105 ft	Draft: 29 ft	Displacement: 39K LT
Per Sqd: 3	Speed: ~20 knots		Range -9,500 nm
Crew: 123	Stand Det: 6	MAGTF: ~10	NSE: ~55 Berths: 197
A/C Stow: 1	A/C Op Spots: 1	JP-5: 1.3 Mil gal	Water: 52.8K Gal/28K gal Per day
Sqft: N/A	CuFt: 1,108,592		Well Deck: N/A
TEU: 61	Med: Sick Call		Stern Ramp: N/A

3 LMSR

Artist Rendition/Notional Configuration



Length: 950 ft	Beam: 106 ft	Draft: 34 ft	Displacement: ~55K LT
Per Sqd: 3	Speed: ~20 knots		Range -9,500 nm
Crew: 30	Stand Det: 48	MAGTF: 705	NSE: ~62 Berths: ~845
A/C Stow: 0	A/C Op Spots: 2/4	JP-5: 380.4K gal	Water: 33.5K gal/24K gal Per day
Sqft: 260, 799	CuFt: 51,682		Well Deck: N/A
TEU: 45	Med: Sick Call		Stern Ramp: 80 ST

2 Legacy



Length: 673 ft	Beam: 106 ft	Draft: 34.6 ft	Displacement: ~46K LT
Per Sqd: 2	Speed: 17.7 knots		Range 12,900 nm
Crew: 30	Stand Det: 16	MAGTF: 71	NSE: ~10 Berths: 127
A/C Stow: 0	A/C Op Spots: 1	JP-5: 1.4 Mil gal	Water: 99K Gal/ 25K Gal Per day
Sqft: 152,185	CuFt: N/A		Well Deck: N/A
TEU: 546	Med: Sick Call		Stern Ramp: 62 ST

The **MPF(F) program** is a critical component of Seabasing by providing the scalable capability to conduct “selective offload” of equipment and supplies, and that permits tailoring of force packages (personnel and equipment) to satisfy specific missions. MPF(F) will capitalize on the strengths of the legacy MPF program and increase the nation’s ability to operate at sea, thereby reducing our reliance upon vulnerable land bases. The program is currently in the Technology Development stage within the Joint Capability Integration and Development System; the MPF(F) Capabilities Development Document (CDD) for increment one (MLP/T-AKE) went to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) during the 2nd quarter FY08, with a Milestone B decision projected in 2010. The CDD for increment two (big decks) is projected to begin staffing during FY08. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is projected in Fiscal Year 2017 with Full Operational Capability projected in Fiscal Year 2022.

MPF(F) Key Points

- OPNAV/N85 is the resource sponsor and program is managed by PMS385. All the information in this paper is contingent upon the VCJCS decision regarding the draft CDD.

- MPF(F) ships are capable of at-sea arrival and assembly of forces and selective offload of equipment sets to meet unique mission requirements, but are not assault echelon ships; they are not forcible entry capable and are not a substitute for amphibious warfare ships.
- The MPF(F) squadron will replace one of the current MPF squadrons, and within the Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS), will be procured incrementally consisting of the following types of ships:
 - Increment One:
 - (3) New construction MLPs (Mobile Landing Platforms).
 - (3) New construction MPF (F) T-AKE (Auxiliary Cargo and Ammunition Ship) variants.
 - Increment Two:
 - (2) New construction MPF(F) LHA(R) (Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement) variants.
 - (1) Legacy LHD (Amphibious Assault Ship Multipurpose) (not a procurement program).
 - Increment Three:
 - (3) New construction MPF (F) LMSR (Large, Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off) (Modified T-AKR 300 or 310 Class) variants.
 - (2) Existing T-AK (Auxiliary Cargo Ship) Sealift Ships (not a procurement program).
- Total fourteen-ship squadron cost ~\$14.5B.
- PR09 plans include six MPF(F) planned during the FYDP: one T-AKE, one LMSR, one LHA(R), and three MLP.
- While MPF(F) retains those prepositioning capabilities associated with current Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), it will provide capabilities beyond those of the existing Maritime Prepositioned Squadron (MPSRON), including surface connector interfaces; organic aviation interfaces and support for tilt-rotor/rotary-wing aircraft, vehicle/equipment and surface connector maintenance; selective offload; Marine Expeditionary Brigade-level command and control; underway and vertical replenishment; and skin-to-skin cargo transfer.
- MPF(F) contribution to strategic Force Application and Focused Logistics is a substantial forward presence capable of rapid force standup/closure. It is a scalable employment option that is operationally flexible. When operating in a threat environment, MPF(F) will be protected by other Naval, joint, or combined forces, and MPF(F) mission capabilities will be fully integrated with other Naval, joint, interagency, and combined forces/systems. It will also provide the means for persistent operations through indefinite sustainment and replenishment, with the ability to rapidly reconstitute and redeploy prepositioned forces in support of follow-on missions.

- MPF (F) is a key enabler for the introduction and sustainment of Marine forces in support of CCDR theater campaign plans. These campaign plans call for increased engagement and deterrence activities through building partner capacity (BPC) activities that call for the same type or quantity of resources that our Marines would need for a conflict requiring operations across the higher end of the range of military operations. However, having rapid and flexible access to the resources that our Marines would need for these combat operations is critical. MPF (F) will be a critical link to ensuring our Marine Corps is better able to respond to crises and combat operations as they arise while still providing the key capabilities that our Marines will need to be successful in phase 0 and phase 1 operations.
- Our ongoing studies and analysis clearly revealed that we will need MLPs and LMSRs able to interoperate and transfer personnel and equipment in sea state three conditions. We also know that we will need TAK-E dry cargo
- IOC/FOC: As each ship of the MPF (F) squadron is delivered, it will incrementally transform one existing squadron from a “port to port” delivery capability to an increasingly selectively off loadable, “sea-based” capability. MPF (F) squadron Initial Operational Capability (IOC) will be considered achieved when the first big deck amphibious ship (LHA(R) or LHD), T-AKE, MLP and LMSR are delivered/provided, embarked with prepositioned assets and deployed, notionally in FY 2017. This will provide the geographic combatant commanders with limited employment, sustainment, and reconstitution capability for a Marine Expeditionary Unit equivalent sized force and will be a key enabler for SC MAGTF activities in their assigned AOR’s. MPF (F) T-AKEs that are delivered prior to IOC will be used to provide a limited selective offload sustainment capability as elements of the MPF (F) squadron are delivered. Deployment of a complete MPF (F) squadron, the Full Operational Capability, is notionally planned for FY 2022.
- While the MPF(F) is not synonymous with Seabasing, it is a critical enabler since the programmed MPF(F) squadron will contain the key at sea transfer enabling capabilities.
 - The current plan will replace only one of the legacy MPF Squadrons as a MPF(F) squadron. The current Marine Corps plan for the future is 2 legacy MPF Squadrons and one MPF(F) squadron.
 - Although not a part of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Assault Echelon(AE), a third reinforcing MEB is required and will be provided via Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) capabilities.
 - Capable of supporting the rapid deployment of three Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB), the Maritime Prepositioning Force is an important element of our expeditionary warfighting capability.

- MPF(F) will provide support to a wide range of military operations with improved capabilities such as at-sea arrival and assembly, selective offload of specific mission sets, and long-term, sea-based sustainment without the need for a benign seaport.
- While the MPF (F) is not intended for forcible entry operations, it is critical for the rapid build up and sustainment of additional follow-on combat forces.
- The MPF(F) squadron is scheduled to have its initial capability in 2017 and fully capable in 2022.
- The fourteen (14) ships of the MPF (F) squadron is designed to consist of three (3) aviation-capable big-deck ships, three (3) large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships, three (3) T-AKE supply ships, three (3) Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP), and two (2) dense-packed container ships.
- The MLP is perhaps the most flexible platform in the MPF(F) squadron. Designed to be the "pier in the ocean," the MLP is an interface platform for other surface lift ships and vessels that facilitates the transfer of equipment and supplies to Seabase connectors or combat shipping.
- The T-AKE is a selectively off-loadable, afloat warehouse ship, which is designed to carry dry, frozen, and chilled cargo; ammunition; and limited fuel. Key holds are reconfigurable for additional flexibility. It has a day/night capable flight deck. These ships can support the dry cargo and compatible ammo requirements of Joint forces and are the same ship class as the Combat Logistics Force T-AKE ships.
- The LMSRs were designed to accommodate the Department of Defense's largest vehicles — such as the Abrams Tanks, Rough Terrain Cargo Handler, and tractor trailers; this capacity is being leveraged to support Marine Corps vehicles and equipment.

The below provides key MPF (F) Squadron capabilities and composition:

- Provide accommodations sufficient to support arrival and assembly (with integration) at-sea of the Baseline MEB, NSE, other Naval Support personnel, Standing Detachments and ship's crew
- Rapid closure of a Baseline MEB to a Sea Base
- Conduct at sea assembly and integration in 24-72 hours
- Project Baseline MEB ashore from the Sea Base and contribute to throughput of Joint forces ashore from over-the-horizon

- Sustain the Baseline MEB ashore from the Sea Base and contribute to throughput and sustainment for additional Joint forces
- Provide sufficient stocks (Combat Load (CL) plus 20-45 Days of Supply (DOS)) and throughput capacity
 - Interoperate with both Naval Logistics and the Joint Theater Logistics Pipeline
 - Provide organizational and intermediate level maintenance for ground equipment and organizational and selected intermediate maintenance for organic aircraft
- Provide Forward Resuscitative Surgery (Level II)
- Accommodate and operate organic surface connectors including providing organizational and selected intermediate maintenance
- Interoperate intra-theater surface connectors to the limits of their inherent sea state capabilities
- Conduct external operations through sea state 3/sea state 4 (threshold/objective (T/O))
- Provide MEB level command and control capability
- Conduct at-sea reconstitution and redeployment

Joint High Speed Connectors (JHSV and JMAC)


The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) bridges the gap between low speed sea lift and high speed airlift. It enables rapid closure of forces to the sea base from advanced bases, logistics movement from pre-positioned ships to amphibious shipping, ship-to-ship replenishment and, in appropriate threat environments, maneuver of assault forces to in-theater austere ports. The Joint Maritime Assault Connector (JMAC) is the functional replacement for the LCAC providing a high-speed, over the beach sea base to shore connector (SSC) capability for carrying all Marine Corps ground equipment.

Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)



The **Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)** is a key piece of the Seabasing architecture. It bridges the gap between low speed sea lift and high speed airlift. JHSVs enable rapid closure of Marine forces to the sea base from advanced bases, logistics movement from pre-positioned ships to amphibious shipping, ship-to-ship replenishment, and, in appropriate threat environments, maneuver of assault forces to in-theater austere ports. Initial procurement objectives are for ten vessels (five Army, five Navy/Marine Corps). Contract award is projected for FY08; subsequent awards are planned for FY09 thru FY11 with delivery of the first JHSV (Army) scheduled for FY10.

Joint Maritime Assault Connector (JMAC)



The **JMAC** is the functional replacement for the LCAC. The JMAC is a high-speed, ship to over the beach connector that will be designed to carry all Marine Corps ground equipment to include an M1A1 tank with track-width mine plow up to a max weight of 73 short-tons. Milestone A has been achieved and the Capabilities Development Document is being developed and targeted for completion in FY08. The JMAC is planned for fleet introduction in 2015. .

JHSV and JMAC Key Points

- OPNAV/N85 is the resource sponsor for the JHSV and the program is managed by a single Navy program office, PMS385.
- JHSV provides a transformational capability that is critical to enabling future concepts for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army. JHSV will be the first element of the sea base connector architecture that will be fielded.
- Regional Combatant Commanders (RCC) identified a current requirement for rapid fielding of JHSV in support of the Global War on Terrorism. JHSV will provide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with a forward deployed (or, if required, a self deploying) mobility asset that will support the rapid force closure and maneuver of MPF(F) and forces and logistics sustainment across the Joint Operations Area to the sea base and austere ports as required.
- Acquisition timeline: Contract award is projected for FY08; with delivery of the first JHSV scheduled for late FY11.
- To meet the current and near-term RCC requirements, the DoN continues to lease foreign built vessels until the JHSV is delivered.
 - WESTPAC EXPRESS (WPE) continues to provide support to III MEF and other Okinawa-based forces, enabling III MEF to expand off-island training and engagement.

- JHSV-2 “SWIFT” provides a test bed for R&D prototypes as well as an operational platform in support of current real world RCC engagement and contingency response requirements worldwide. HSV-2 played a key role in support of JTF Katrina. The ship was recently used for the pilot Global Fleet Station (GFS) deployment in SOUTHCOM. The charter for SWIFT was recently renewed, and the military crew will be replaced by civilians
- OPNAV/N85 is the JMAC resource sponsor and the program will be managed by a single Navy program office, PMS377; the Army is also participating in JMAC development.
- Key improvements of the JMAC (over the LCAC) include:
 - Increased payload.
 - Increased operating range.
 - Decreased operating and maintenance costs.
 - Systems to reduce crewing requirements and increase the crew day.

Section 3 -Questions & Proposed Answers

Q. What is the status of the Seabasing concept within the DoD acquisition process?

A. Capability development within the Department of Defense is accomplished through the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS). The JCIDS process starts with a concept, in this case the Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept, which describes how a Joint Force Commander conducts operations 8 to 20 years in the future. After the concept is approved, experimentation and a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) normally run concurrently. The CBA is a rigorous analysis process designed to determine Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) changes required to conduct operations in the manner proposed in the concept. The CBA includes: the Functional Area Analysis (FAA) – what do I need to execute the concept, the Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) – how well will I do with the current programmed capabilities, and the Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) – how do I improve my capabilities. The results of the FAA and FNA are used to develop a Joint Capabilities Document (JCD). Which capabilities are analyzed for solution sets, and ultimately developed or procured is decided upon at the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).

The Joint Seabasing effort has progressed according to the following timeline:

- Seabasing JIC was approved by the JROC in Aug 05.
- The FAA was approved by the JROC in Dec 05.
- The FNA was approved by the JROC in Nov 06; it identified 17 critical capability gaps.
- The JCD was approved by the JROC in Dec 07.

- The JROC directed a Joint Seabasing Analysis and Wargaming (JSAW) effort be conducted to use additional modeling and simulation for further scoping the identified gaps. The JSAW is expected to be completed in 2008.
- FSAs are expected to commence in Oct 08 and conclude during FY09. Upon JROC approval of the FSAs, Seabasing capabilities will be developed either by entering the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) via Initial Capabilities Documents (ICDs) or through DOTMLPF change requests.

Q. How does the decision to delay ship acquisition impact the Marine Corps?

A. The Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) program is a critically essential element of the Marine Corps warfighting capability.

The Marine Corps requires three Marine Expeditionary Brigade's (MEB) worth of expeditionary warfighting capability and lift. We have already accepted risk in our amphibious lift capacity by agreeing to fiscally constrain shipping availability for each of our two MEB assault echelons from 17 to 15 ships. And, the FY09 30-year shipbuilding plan does not provide the exact mix of required LHA/LHD's, LPD-17's, and LSD-41/49 equivalents, which further amplifies the risk we're taking in our amphibious forcible entry capabilities.

The Marine Corps intends to fight any major contingency operation as a Marine Expeditionary Force. The 30 operationally available amphibious ships required for 2.0 MEB Assault Echelon (AE), coupled with MPF(F)'s 1.0 MEB-level reinforcing and support, and the Assault Follow-On Echelon (lifted by MSC black-bottom shipping) provide the 3.0 MEB necessary to enable a seabased, MEF-level warfighting capability.

Q. What are the requirements for numbers and types of amphibious ships? And what are the assumptions and related risks in sizing?

A. It requires 17 ships to hold a brigade size MAGTF -- 17 ships per expeditionary brigade. However, a decision was made, two years ago, by the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations to accept a level of risk with 15 ships per Marine expeditionary brigade for a total of 30 operationally available ships. Assuming a ten percent non availability rate due to maintenance the requirement is 33 ships. Just like anything else, (e.g. airplanes and vehicles) everything's not up 100 percent of the time, ships have to go into maintenance also.

The required ship mix is eleven LHA/LHD, eleven LPD-17, and eleven LSD-41 or -49 ships. And that's how we got the total requirement agreed to by the chief of naval operations and the commandant of 33 ships -- 11 big decks, 11 LPD-17s and 11 LSDs.

Q. What is the Marine Corps amphibious lift requirements derived from?

A. The Marine Corps amphibious lift requirements are derived from Major Contingency Operation plans and Combatant Commander presence demands. The current amphibious lift requirement is 33 operationally available assault ships. This is sufficient to support a simultaneous amphibious assault by two Marine Expeditionary Brigades. Because of fiscal constraints, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations have agreed to accept risk by reducing the amphibious lift requirement to 30 operationally available ships as the minimum. However, this 30-ship assault echelon fleet must include at least ten “big deck” aviation capable assault ships (LHA/LHD/LHA(R)), at least ten LPD-17’s and 10 LSD 41/49’s.

Q. What are the USMC priorities in terms of fixing the expeditionary ship capabilities and the shortfalls?

A. The Commandant's number one unfunded priority for 2008 is the tenth LPD. Right now the LPD-17 line is scheduled to be shut in fiscal year '09. The Marine Corps would like the tenth and eleventh LPD fully funded.

Q. What is the defense system for Seabasing? It would seem that the ships that make up any given sea base would be vulnerable to air, surface, and sub-surface attacks?

A. Achieving battlespace superiority in forward theaters is central to the SEA SHIELD concept, especially as enemy area-denial capabilities increase. Standard Navy practices to leverage and network all the radars and defense systems of ships in the operating area will provide the common air, surface, and sub-surface “pictures” required to ensure the elements of the sea base are protected. In times of rising tension, pre-positioned naval units will sustain access for friendly forces and maritime trade by employing expeditionary sensor grids and advanced deployable systems to locate and track enemy threats. Maritime patrol aircraft, ships, submarines, and unmanned vehicles will provide comprehensive situational awareness and cue intercepting units. Speed will be an ally as linked sensors, high-speed platforms, and improved kill vehicles consolidate area control.

Future SEA SHIELD Technologies are:

- Interagency intelligence and communications reach-back systems
- Organic mine countermeasures
- Multi-sensor cargo inspection equipment
- Advanced hull forms and modular mission payloads
- Directed-energy weapons
- Autonomous unmanned vehicles
- Common undersea picture
- Single integrated air picture
- Distributed weapons coordination
- Theater missile defense

For more information on Sea Shield go to:
<http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/content/conops/SeaShieldM.aspx>

Q. What are the restrictions to sea based operations due to high sea states?

A. The Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (JIC), in its assessment of Seabasing risks, states, Adverse weather conditions and sea state impact sea-based operations can affect the rapid build-up of combat power and timely sustainment of employed forces” (1) Issues of sustainment under unfavorable conditions, such as in high sea states with degraded ship-to-ship movement, can be addressed, in part, using the metric of *relative sustainment capacity*, defined as the ratio of maximum sustainment throughput capacity (in short tons per day) to sustainment requirement (also in short tons per day). Overcapacity exists under favorable conditions when this ratio exceeds 100 percent. Overcapacity is needed to ensure adequate capacity under unfavorable conditions. Overcapacity can also release some sea base assets (notably, MV-22 aircraft) for support to ground forces under favorable conditions.

A threshold of Sea Base operability through Sea State 3 (associated with wind speeds of 7 to 10 knots, or 8 to 12 miles per hour, with waves about 2 feet high) has been set. An objective of operability through Sea State 4 (associated with winds of 11 to 16 knots, or 13 to 18 miles per hour, with waves about 3 feet high) has been set.

Percentage of Sea State 3 or Less Conditions for Various Littoral Regions

Western Atlantic 60	Mediterranean Sea 75
Eastern Atlantic 40	Persian Gulf 89
North Sea/English Channel 52	North Arabian Sea 73
Eastern Pacific 45	West Indian Ocean 52
West and So. Caribbean 53	Cape of Good Hope 21
Northeast South America 54	Gulf of Guinea 71
Western South Atlantic 43	Northwest Africa 48
Eastern South Pacific 40	East Coast of Japan 48
Northwest South America 55	East Coast Philippines 62
Western Central America 73	Korean Coast 71

Using the threshold value of Sea State 3, this table suggests that undegraded logistics operations from a sea base will be possible at least 70 percent of the time in the high profile regions of the Persian Gulf and North Arabian Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Korean Coast.

Sources:

Naval Research Advisory Committee, Panel on Sea Basing, *Sea Basing*, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), March 2005, p. 37.

Defense Science Board, Task Force on Mobility, *Enabling Sea Basing Capabilities*, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, September 2005, p. 60.

Defense Science Board, Task Force on Mobility (2005, p. 37).

Q. What is the total cost of Seabasing and if not available what is the cost in relationship to land bases as opposed to a sea base?

A. Still being researched.

Q. How are the Army and Air Force being integrated into the Seabasing concept and what is their position?

A. One would have to ask the Army and the Air Force for their current position however the Navy and Marine Corps has reached out to all services, multinational partners and interagency to participate in the development of the Seabasing concept in a wide variety of ways and forums. The most recent outreach and integration was in the Marine Corps' Title X wargame, Expeditionary Warrior 2008, involving over 400 participants from across all the services, foreign countries and other US Government agencies. The following perspectives were captured in the wargame outbrief:

Views from the **Air Force** representative:

- Recognize capabilities of sea based forces to support forward C4ISR, force protection and integrated air and missile defense
- Seek to leverage Seabasing to support Air Force concepts of employment and in-theater C2
- Seabasing supports Air Force operations through the significant C4ISR and targeting capabilities it persistently provides in an operating area as well as airfield seizure, security, and logistical support etc. The wider AF does not appear to understand this well
- USAF can support Joint Seabasing by participating in Sea Shield (AWACS, Airborne Laser), and other FP operations.
- USAF can support the Joint Seabase by applying overhead imagery.
- Has a connecting role by providing inter/intra-theater airlift.

Views from the **Army** representative:

- The Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has spent considerable time and effort over the recent years examining how Joint Seabasing can enable future Army operations and has produced a Seabasing concept paper that captures their views.
- Recognize the advantages of using the sea for maneuver and force protection

- See Seabasing as a means to support Army concepts and capabilities of operational maneuver from strategic distances (high speed ship), high speed intra-theater sealift (JHSV), aviation capable platform to support heavy lift and operational mounted maneuver of medium and heavy forces (JHL)
- See great utility in Seabasing as a means to more quickly bring an Army Brigade Combat Team or two into a high end fight and mitigate the potential “operational pause” normally associated between initial forcible entry forces and reinforcements.

Q. What is the current "buy-in" from State Dept for this Seabasing concept?

Someone would have to ask the State Department for their official position on Seabasing. That said, significant interagency integration efforts were explored at Expeditionary Warrior 2008, the Marine Corps Title 10 war game, with a former ambassador serving as a senior mentor and other state department officials and experts participating throughout the week. The results posted on the internet in the Quick Look Report posted on the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratories website states:

“The sea base provides the U.S. Chief of Mission an ability to bring a “whole of government” capability to bear without triggering host nation sensitivities over a large U.S. presence. The sea base can remain off-shore and out of sight, ready to provide a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) or demonstrate U.S. commitment to regional security and stability on very short notice. More experimentation and training is needed to fully develop and exploit the interagency use of the sea base.”

Ambassador David Passage, a retired 33-year veteran of the U.S. Foreign Service who attended the wargame said, “When I was Chief of Mission, I would have loved to have had the flexibility that this concept provides.”

Q. Has the role of the Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan as a land-based role reduced the Corps amphibious skills and capabilities required to project power ashore from sea?

A. We have a couple of generations of young company-grade officers, now, that have never even been aboard a ship, because we've been focused solely and very narrowly on the set of operations that we're doing in Iraq and Afghanistan.

One of the driving factors behind growing the Marine Corps up to 202,000 was to give us a little bit of elasticity in the deploying units. Right now there are a large percentage of frontline combat units that are on about a one-to-one dwell to rotation. They're gone for seven months; they're home for seven months.

If we grow the force, we get a little bit more dwell, hopefully two to one, which is our goal. So that allows us the opportunity to do some full-scale operations in training. And

we're building that capability right now, with the growth of the force, and with training plans.

Q. What is the impact on the Marine Corps' amphibious assault capability due to the reduction of the planned purchases of EFVs?

A. The Marine Corps' decision to reduce the requirement for Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles (EFV) from 1163 to 573 was made as a result of lessons learned combined with the 2006 Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) tasking the Marine Corps to "consider an appropriate mix of vehicles to support irregular operations."

Amphibious forcible entry operations are maneuver operations where lethality and survivability are measured to some extent by our ability to disperse or concentrate forces. While ability to maneuver remains a factor in irregular operations, two other facets have forced a change in requirements placed on Marines and their equipment. First is the necessity to maintain proximity with the population. Second, maneuver is constrained when Marine forces move into more populated areas where their activities, tactics, and vulnerabilities can be discretely observed by an enemy who specializes in blending with the population. Faced with this new limited ability to maneuver, we found a need to adopt tactics and subsequently, reevaluated our vehicle requirements.

The Marine Corps is balancing our two missions of amphibious assault and participation in long-term, irregular warfare by shifting from a largely singular focus on amphibious forcible entry to a mix of platforms that have application across the range of military operations. We have tailored our EFV investment to be consistent with the SPG and have offset these reductions with investments in the Marine Personnel Carrier and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. In the near term, our investment in Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles will afford Marines operating in Iraq and Afghanistan with significantly enhanced protection tailored specifically for operation in the Central Command theater.

The reduction of the EFV requirement will not limit our ability to conduct surface-borne ship-to-objective forcible entry from a distant sea-base or constrain our ability to conduct amphibious operation and subsequent maneuver ashore in support of national objectives. We will continue to pursue a balance of vehicles that will enable our Navy-Marine Corps team to increasingly provide a persistent and flexible forward presence, both afloat and ashore, to meet combatant commanders' growing requirements for general purpose forces. Our future mobility systems will enable us to more effectively engage in low-end engagement, deterrence, and security missions while also positioning us to respond to high-end combat and forcible entry amphibious operations.

Q. Why doesn't the Maritime Strategy specifically mention Seabasing?

A There was a widespread belief within the Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard writing team that, for a variety of reasons, the meaning of the term "Seabasing" had become confused within DOD. They concluded that it was frequently being viewed as merely a logistics function to support major combat operations, which often generated a further misperception that Maritime Prepositioning Force-Future would fulfill the total

Seabasing requirement. The writers therefore opted for an approach which clearly calls for and implies Seabasing without specifically using the term. They championed seapower as our asymmetric advantage in an era of political, military, and geographic challenges to access. By describing our ability to use the sea as both maneuver space and as a secure base from which we can influence events ashore across the spectrum of operations, they succinctly articulated the conceptual underpinnings of seabasing. Having codified the “big idea” in the strategy, we will use the forthcoming *Naval Operations Concept 2008* to explicitly describe the critical importance of seabasing to strategy implementation.