

Seabasing

Joint Integrating Concept

Version 1.0



01 August 2005

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This JIC contains titles or language similar to existing or future programs, solution sets, etc. which are intended to create a common understanding of future joint concepts and capabilities. In particular, Annex D contains detailed illustrative CONOPS. Programs, solution sets, etc. used in these CONOPS are not intended to justify future programs and solution sets or constrain the Capability Based Assessment (CBA) but to illustrate the concept.

46 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

47
48 A joint concept is a visualization of future operations that describe how a commander, using
49 military art and science, might employ capabilities to achieve desired effects and objectives. It
50 need not be limited by current or programmed capabilities.¹ **Seabasing** is one of several
51 evolving Joint Integrating Concepts (JIC) that describes, "...how a Joint Force Commander
52 (JFC) 10-20 years in the future will integrate capabilities to generate effects and achieve an
53 objective."² This document describes how Seabasing will complement, integrate and enable
54 joint military capabilities throughout the littorals with minimal or no access to nearby land bases.
55 It defines joint Seabasing, explains its relevance to strategic guidance and joint concepts, lays out
56 assumptions and risks, identifies essential capabilities, defines attributes, and provides guidelines
57 of how joint Seabasing can be executed to support national military objectives.

U.S. forces must react promptly to theater needs from a posture that minimizes footprint. DOD is changing U.S. global basing policy, placing more emphasis on the ability to surge quickly to trouble spots across the globe, and making U.S. forces more agile and expeditionary. The new challenge is to project joint power more rapidly to confront unexpected threats.

DOD Congressional Testimony, 2005

"Statement Of Secretary Of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld FY 2006 Department Of Defense Budget Senate Armed Services Committee", February 17, 2005, p. 3

58
59 This JIC outlines the concept for Seabasing. It describes closing, assembling, employing,
60 sustaining and reconstituting joint forces from a sea base during a range of military operations in
61 the 2015 to 2025 timeframe, including:

- 62 • Major Combat Operation (MCO)
- 63 • Preemptive MCO with limited forward access
- 64 • Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Operation
- 65 • Counterinsurgency Operation (COIN)

66

¹ Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan approved by CJCS July 2004

² IBID

Seabasing is defined as the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). These capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea.

67 These scenarios can be conducted as stand-alone operations or in a near-simultaneous
68 scenario. Success in these operations requires a rapid global response with an integrated array of
69 capabilities, from combat capabilities to defeat the forces that threaten stability and security, to
70 capabilities integrated with DOD and non-DOD agencies for stability and security operations.

71 Seabasing enables early arrival and synchronization of joint force capabilities providing
72 strategic speed, access, and persistence for military operations including presence, through
73 combat against conventional as well as irregular threats. Capitalizing on the capabilities of
74 forward deployed, pre-positioned and immediate/rapid response forces, Seabasing improves
75 operational tempo while seizing the initiative without an operational pause. Seabasing also
76 reduces force protection challenges ashore, especially during the early stages of a crisis, and
77 increases joint force operational maneuver by allowing the JFC to fully exploit the sea as
78 maneuver space to enhance capabilities and gain advantage over the adversary. Some
79 operational capabilities attributed to Seabasing are not available today; however once realized,
80 Seabasing will:

- 81 • Complement overseas presence and forward basing strategy as described in the IGPBS.
- 82 • Provide the ability to rapidly assemble forces at the sea base with minimal or no in-
83 theater host and coalition nation support. This enables force closure and employment of
84 joint force capabilities when forward access is denied.
- 85 • Enable joint force access, complement existing basing, and enhance power projection.
86 Seabasing provides commanders with greater flexibility to rapidly and effectively build
87 and integrate joint capabilities during the early stages of operations particularly when the
88 political situation restricts basing, overflight or US presence. Seabasing supports setting
89 the conditions for the immediate integration of follow-on sustainment of personnel,
90 equipment, and supplies while minimizing footprint ashore.
- 91 • Support parallel and concurrent execution of all phases of forcible entry by enabling
92 shorter response times and the simultaneous defeat of multi-dimensional threats.

- 93 • Provide a dynamic, mobile, networked set of platforms from which selected joint forces
94 can operate in relative safety, while reducing risk to vulnerable facilities ashore. It can
95 also diminish the political implications of host government support for US forces by
96 reducing insurgent ability to exploit our presence as a propaganda tool.
- 97 • Provide an array of joint force options and sustained employment through the flexibility
98 afforded by projecting and sustaining forces through the sea base (strike, forcible entry,
99 security operations, special operations, freedom of navigation, humanitarian assistance
100 or disaster relief).
- 101 • Enhance the sustainment of future expeditionary joint force operations and minimize the
102 operational pause associated with the build-up of large logistic stockpiles.
- 103 • Support high tempo, distributed joint operations and the capabilities for unit recovery,
104 replenishment, reconstitution, re-positioning, and reemployment allowing rapid response
105 to emerging asymmetrical and conventional threats within or outside the area of
106 operations.
- 107 • Provide three force employment options that can be exploited by the Combatant
108 Command (COCOM): 1) preemptive battlespace shaping through early joint integration
109 of immediate response forces; 2) seizing the initiative through accelerated closure and
110 sustainment of rapid response forces; and 3) seamless preparation for decisive
111 operations³ through rapid reinforcement by follow on forces.

112 These advantages are embodied in the principles of joint Seabasing:

114 **PRINCIPLES OF SEABASING**

- 116 **1) Use the sea as maneuver space.**
- 118 **2) Leverage forward presence and joint interdependence**
- 3) Protect joint force operations.**
- 4) Provide scalable, responsive joint power projection.**
- 5) Sustain joint force operations from the sea.**
- 6) Expand access options and reduce dependence on land bases.**
- 7) Create uncertainty for our adversaries.**

119 Through joint Seabasing, the President and/or the Secretary of Defense and military leaders
120 have the capability to rapidly build and integrate credible joint combat power and command and
121 control (C2) forward to deter escalation, enhance security, and provide assistance. In an MCO

122 this includes seizing the initiative, and providing synchronized projection of joint force
123 capability to achieve initial military objectives. This may include defeating anti-access
124 challenges and setting conditions to enable the rapid build-up of joint combat power through the
125 use of simultaneous force flows by air and sea across multiple entry points.

126 The Seabasing JIC integrates capabilities from Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs), Joint
127 Functional Concepts and Joint Integrating Concepts, and distills them into five lines of operation
128 with associated tasks, attributes, conditions and standards. Specific tasks, conditions and
129 standards are identified in Annex C.

LINES OF OPERATION

CLOSE – rapid closure of joint force capability to an area of crisis.

ASSEMBLE – seamless integration of scalable joint force capabilities on and around secure sea-based assets.

EMPLOY – flexible employment of joint force capabilities to meet mission objectives supported from the sea base.

SUSTAIN – persistent sustainment of selected joint forces afloat and ashore, through transition to decisive combat operations ashore.

RECONSTITUTE – the capability to rapidly recover, reconstitute and redeploy joint combat capabilities within and around the maneuverable sea base for subsequent operations.

130
131 Lines of operation are discussed in greater detail throughout the document. In addition, the
132 following attributes of Seabasing capabilities assist in qualifying metrics, conditions and
133 standards:

134

135

136

137

138

139

³ The current 4 phases of a campaign is being revised to include 6 total phases: 1) Shape; 2) Deter; 3) Seize the Initiative; 4) Dominate; 5) Stabilize; and 6) Enable Civil Authority. This change will be reflected in the next revision of the Seabasing JIC.

CAPABILITY ATTRIBUTES

CAPACITY – the measure of how much joint force capability can be supported.

RATE – how fast things can be accomplished to support joint force capability over a given time under standard sets of conditions.

INFRASTRUCTURE – the measure of a family of systems and capabilities that provide essential services toward accomplishing the mission.

INTEROPERABILITY – the degree to which Seabasing can seamlessly integrate and support joint force capability.

SURVIVABILITY – the degree to which Seabasing can protect joint force capabilities.

ACCESSIBILITY – the flexibility to bypass or operate within the physical constraints presented by terrain, hydrography, weather, depth of operations, and threat.

140

141 The Seabasing JIC, amplified by four detailed, illustrative Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

142 (Annex D), supports the following top-level measures of performance to assist Capabilities

143 Based Assessment (CBA), joint experimentation (e.g., Sea Viking, Nimble Viking, Unified

144 Course, Unified Quest, etc.), acquisition, and future concept development.

TOP-LEVEL MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE (THRESHOLD)

CLOSE joint sea-based capabilities, including elements of JC2, to a JOA to support major combat operations within 10-14 days of execution order.

ASSEMBLE and integrate joint capabilities from the sea base to support major combat operations within 24-72 hours of arrival within the JOA.

EMPLOY over-the-horizon from the sea base at least one (1) brigade for JFEO within a period of darkness (8-10 hrs).

SUSTAIN joint sea-based operations, including up to at least two (2) joint brigades operating ashore, for an indefinite period using secure advanced bases up to 2000 nm away; also support selected joint maintenance and provide level III medical within the sea base.

RECONSTITUTE one (1) brigade from ashore to the sea base and reemploy within 10-14 days of execution order.

145 Seabasing provides a new paradigm from which to examine and balance the strategic
146 mobility triad (airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning). Current strategic mobility cannot project and
147 sustain US forces in distant anti-access or area-denial environments without reliance on land

148 bases within the Joint Operating Area in order to seize the initiative within minimal or moderate
149 risk. A balanced strategic mobility triad that includes additional high-speed sealift and
150 operationalized maritime pre-positioning capabilities is needed to improve future mobility and
151 sustainment capabilities. This document illustrates interdependence between a balanced strategic
152 mobility triad and a compressed timeline to rapidly close, assemble, employ, sustain and
153 reconstitute joint forces.

154 Seabasing is a transformational joint concept that provides a means to achieve strategic
155 military goals. Our national leaders will use Seabasing as a strategic enabler combining the
156 aspects of forward presence and engagement with the capability to rapidly deploy and employ
157 forces to meet the future security challenges presented by traditional, disruptive, catastrophic,
158 and irregular threats within the range of military operations. As an operational enabler,
159 Seabasing exploits the maneuver space and sovereignty of the sea to provide the COCOMs with
160 greater operational independence. As a JIC, Seabasing is interdependent with emerging joint and
161 service concepts and complements the IGPBS.
162

162 **Section 1 – PURPOSE**

163

164 “We are developing joint sea bases that will allow our forces to strike from floating
165 platforms close to the action, instead of being dependent on land bases far from the fight.”

166

167 *President George W. Bush*

168

2005 USNA Commencement Address

169

170 Future security environments will become increasingly complicated through changing
171 international relationships, increased acts of terrorism, the expanded influence of non-state
172 actors, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the United States’ security
173 strategy for the 21st Century continues to evolve, our nation remains committed to its global
174 responsibilities to ensure national security through peace, prosperity, and freedom. However, US
175 options to extend global influence through forward basing of military capability are diminishing
176 or being adversely altered⁴. The implications of this are still being studied, but the challenge for
177 our national and military leaders will be to maintain global presence and security in the face of
178 uncertain access.

179 The Seabasing JIC describes how the presence, closure and assembly, employment,
180 sustainment, reconstitution, and re-employment of operational capabilities at sea, through the
181 sea, and from the sea will enhance stability through engagement, assure access to critical regions
182 and expand maneuver options across the range of military operations (ROMO) in 2015-2025. A
183 rigorous assessment and analysis of capability gaps and excesses based on this document will be
184 conducted in order to reach appropriate materiel and non-materiel solutions. As the basis for
185 performing this assessment, this concept defines lines of operation, tasks, attributes, conditions,
186 and standards for conducting future sea-based operations.

187 This JIC will shape joint and service experimentation to address identified capability gaps
188 and provide the framework for recommending potential solutions across the range of Doctrine,
189 Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities
190 (DOTMLPF) solutions.

191

192

⁴ In the Overseas Basing Commission Report, the Commission expressed concern that the air and sea ports, inter-nodal connectivities and other mobility enabling systems are not adequate to meet political contingencies.

192 **Section 2 – SCOPE**

193

194 *A sea base is not just a ship, not just pre-positioned materiel, not just helicopter assault*
195 *– it represents a complex capability. One must think of a sea base as a hybrid system of*
196 *systems consisting of concepts of operations, ships, forces, offensive and defensive*
197 *weapons, aircraft, communications and logistics, all of which involve careful planning,*
198 *coordination and exercising to operate smoothly.”*

199

200

Defense Science Board

201

Task Force on Sea Basing, Aug 2003

202

203 **2.1 Strategic Guidance.** The need for military access to retain global freedom of action is a
204 consistent theme throughout the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and the
205 National Military Strategy. The Seabasing concept conforms to strategic guidance and is an
206 extension of the reference documents found in Annex A. Specifically, Seabasing supports the
207 goals of assuring allies and friends, deterring aggression, dissuading potential adversaries,
208 rapidly responding to irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges, and if necessary, quickly
209 defeating foes in combat.

210

211 **2.2 Timeframe.** This concept focuses on the 2015-2025 timeframe.

212

213 **2.3 Definition.** Seabasing is the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection,
214 reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing
215 continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without
216 reliance on land bases within the JOA. These capabilities expand operational maneuver options,
217 and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea.

218

219 **2.4 Assumptions.** The following assumptions were used in the development of this JIC:

- 220 • Reduced access to forward operations bases (FOBs) (insight taken from Overseas Basing
221 Commission Report⁵).
- 222 • US joint forces will be required to conduct operations in anti-access environments.

⁵ In the Overseas Basing Commission Report, the Commission expressed concern that the air and sea ports, inter-nodal connectivities and other mobility enabling systems are not adequate to meet political contingencies.

- 223 • CONOPS and force structure based on Baseline Security Posture (BSP), Defense
224 Planning Scenario(s) (DPS) and Multi-Service Force Deployment (MSFD) campaigns
225 with the following deviations:
- 226 ➤ Seabasing will complement existing OPLANS, CONPLANS, and FUNCPLANS by
227 reducing footprint at land bases, denying the adversary Essential Elements of Friendly
228 Information (EEFI), reducing transloads and minimizing enroute stops, and
229 compressing reception, staging, onward movement and integration of joint forces.
 - 230 ➤ Future Seabasing systems, platforms, and capabilities will be employed (e.g., high-
231 speed inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface), selective off-load, etc.).
 - 232 ➤ Key Seabasing elements will continue to be forward deployed or pre-positioned in
233 accordance with current and future defense strategies.

234 In addition, to support the scope of the effort, CONOPS development was bounded by the
235 following considerations:

- 236 • Examining an operational force capable of supporting four scenarios, including Major
237 Combat Operations (MCO)(SDTE and Preemptive), Counterinsurgency Operations
238 (COIN), and Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Operations.
- 239 • No specific force size has been established for these operations, however to support
240 capabilities and CONOPS development, the JIC referred to the 2003 Defense Science
241 Board (DSB) Task Force on Seabasing that examined Seabasing in support of brigade-
242 sized or larger combat operations.

243

244 **2.5 Assessment of Risk.** In any operation, a variety of factors can pose risks to execution. The
245 JFC can mitigate these risks by accounting for and addressing these factors in advance. Many of
246 these factors are common across most, if not all, operations. Some factors have a greater impact
247 on Seabasing operations and are detailed below:

- 248 • Enemy anti-access capability – mines, missiles, aircraft, submarines, ships, and
249 surveillance assets – threaten or delay the sea base’s ability to achieve maritime and
250 air/space superiority.
- 251 • Force protection assets supporting the sea base must provide sufficient protection for the
252 sea base and employed forces.
- 253 • Adverse weather conditions and sea state impact sea-based operations and affect the rapid
254 build-up of combat power and timely sustainment of employed forces.

- 255 • Capacity, rate, and survivability of high-speed inter and intra-theater connectors
256 (air/surface) must be sufficient to provide for the timely closure, assembly and
257 sustainment of the sea base.
- 258 • Capacity, rate, and survivability of prime movers and connectors (air/surface) must be
259 sufficient to provide for the timely projection and sustainment of necessary combat power
260 ashore.
- 261 • Range of operations can be affected by need for self-protection and the size, distance, and
262 distribution of joint forces that need to be sustained.
- 263 • Sea-based joint C2 is dependent on a secure, reliable, net-centric environment that
264 supports distributed, on-the-move (OTM), over-the-horizon (OTH) operations.
- 265 • Future treaties and international laws may impact Seabasing operations.
- 266 • CONUS-based and forward land-based platforms/points of embarkation are vulnerable to
267 terrorist attack.
- 268 • Surface vessels have unique decontamination requirements when subjected to
269 chemical/biological attack.

270

271 **2.6 Future Joint Context Documents.** The Seabasing concept supports future joint context
272 documents.

273

274 **2.7 Applicable Military Operations.** Seabasing supports a wide range of military operations,
275 from presence and deterrence missions to contributing to the conduct of an MCO.

276

277 **2.8 Applicable Military Functions and Activities.** The following military functions and
278 activities apply to Seabasing:

- 279 • **Force Application (FA).** The FA capabilities of maneuver and engagement are key
280 capabilities in the Seabasing concept, with the specific application that these joint
281 capabilities are projected from the sea.
- 282 • **Joint Command and Control (Joint C2).** Seabasing supports applicable Joint C2,
283 including elements of JFC, component, and multinational staffs. Specific application
284 includes: monitoring/collecting data, developing situational awareness, developing
285 courses of action/plan, executing and monitoring the plan; and using collaborative C2
286 capabilities for preparation, planning, virtual rehearsal, and simulation in support of
287 employment.

- 288 • **Force Protection (FP).** A key application is the integrated protection of joint forces
289 afloat and ashore within the JOA through the use of core FP capabilities (detect, assess,
290 warn, defend, and recover).
- 291 • **Battlespace Awareness (BA).** The application of BA in Seabasing includes all domains
292 (air/space, cyber, maritime, and land). The actions necessary to support Seabasing
293 operations include monitoring, tasking and integration of intelligence, as well as
294 predictive analysis of adversary intentions, goals, and objectives. These capabilities
295 require persistent observation and reconnaissance. ISR assets must conduct surveillance
296 over large areas and also concentrate on specific areas and items of interest in order to
297 find, identify, focus, and continuously track specific contacts of interest.
- 298 • **Focused Logistics (FL).** Key applications include joint at-sea arrival and assembly,
299 selective on-load/off-load, medical, maintenance, total asset/in-transit visibility,
300 flexible/tailored sustainment, and reconstitution.
- 301 • **Net Centric (NC).** Seabasing requires the networking of all joint force elements to
302 support information discovery, sharing, and management; collaboration; adaptive
303 organizations; exploitation of force interdependencies; and a greater unity of effort via
304 synchronization of the force at the tactical and operational levels. NC includes
305 distributed OTH/OTM communications.
- 306 • **Force Management (FM).** The sea base provides the JFC with additional options for
307 conducting the full range of military operations within the integrated global basing
308 posture.
- 309

310 **2.9 Relationship to Joint Concepts.** Seabasing is fundamentally about conducting operations
311 from the sea. It serves as an at-sea enabler for numerous other joint concepts, including:

- 312 • **Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO) JIC.** Seabasing and JFEO are
313 complementary concepts, as Seabasing provides additional options for operational
314 maneuver and forcible entry. This is particularly relevant considering the risks cited
315 within the JFEO JIC for limited future basing options.
- 316 • **Global Strike JIC.** Seabasing complements global strike by providing sea-based strike
317 assets, forward positioned C2 capabilities, and other joint force capabilities.
- 318 • **Joint Undersea Superiority (JUSS) JIC.** Seabasing both enables and is enabled by
319 Undersea Superiority – this includes providing assets from the sea base to achieve

- 320 Undersea Superiority and the required capability to protect the sea base from undersea
321 threats such as mines and submarines.
- 322 • **Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) JIC.** Seabasing forces complement
323 IAMD with unique capabilities from the sea base, to include air and missile defense of
324 both the sea base and designated inland areas.
 - 325 • **Command and Control (C2) JIC.** The key relationship between Seabasing and Joint
326 C2 is the flexibility of the sea base to support Joint C2 through capabilities afloat and net-
327 centric reach back to shore-based HQs.
 - 328 • **Joint Logistics (Distribution) JIC.** Seabasing and joint logistics are closely aligned.
329 Sustaining joint forces is one of the major Seabasing lines of operation, and several key
330 capabilities are shared by both concepts, including C2, total asset/in-transit visibility,
331 selective off-load/on-load, and medical and tailored logistics packages. Seabasing
332 provides a viable means...from the sea...to support logistics for joint forces ashore.
333

334 **Section 3 – CENTRAL AND SUPPORTING IDEAS**

335

336 *"From the beginning, America has sought international support for our operations in*
337 *Afghanistan and Iraq, and we have gained much support. There is a difference, however,*
338 *between leading a coalition of many nations, and submitting to the objections of a few.*
339 *America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country."*

340

341 *President George W. Bush*

342 *State of the Union Address, 20 Jan 04*

343

344 **3.1 Statement of Military Problem.** Future security environments will become increasingly
345 complicated through international political relationships, increased acts of terrorism, the
346 expanded influence of non-state actors, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
347 (WMD). Potential enemies are more likely to attack US forces abroad with increasingly lethal
348 weapons, including WMD, either developed by indigenous industries or purchased abroad.
349 Many nations may find it politically untenable to host US bases or allow access through their
350 territory (as illustrated in Figure 3.1). Recent Congressional testimony emphasizes that US
351 forces must react promptly to theater needs from a posture that minimizes footprint, partly due to
352 increasingly low regional tolerance for long-term foreign military presence no matter how well
353 intentioned, and partly because of the regions' dynamic nature requiring maximum flexibility.
354 Furthermore, changes to DOD global basing will emphasize forward presence and engagement
355 as well as the ability to surge quickly to trouble spots. This requires forces that are more agile
356 and expeditionary. *The new challenge is to project concentrated joint power more quickly to*
357 *confront unexpected threats.*⁶

358 As indicated in strategic guidance, the US still requires secure strategic access and the
359 freedom to act globally.

⁶ "Statement Of Secretary Of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld FY 2006 Department Of Defense Budget Senate Armed Services Committee", February 17, 2005, p. 3

360 However, during periods
 361 of crisis, COCOMs will
 362 need the capability to
 363 contain the crisis by
 364 deterring potential
 365 adversaries or seizing
 366 the initiative to swiftly
 367 defeat enemy actions.
 368 Given the likely
 369 operational environment,
 370 the JFC must be able to




Figure 3-1 Reduced Overseas Basing

371 project power when forward basing may not be available. Even where FOBs are otherwise
 372 available, their use may be politically undesirable or operationally restricted for military use, and
 373 the JFC may desire to reduce the footprint and visibility of the joint force. In addition, US
 374 presence at FOBs may be a source of friction in some coalition situations and present security
 375 challenges that threaten operational objectives. Lastly, where potential air, sea, and land entry
 376 points are available, their predictability allows the enemy to focus his anti-access capabilities
 377 against our forces. As a result, Seabasing will be a critical capability for joint forces in 2015-
 378 2025 that increases options while decreasing liabilities both politically and militarily.

379 Projecting and sustaining joint combat power from the seas, Seabasing assures joint access
 380 by leveraging the operational maneuver of sovereign, distributed, and networked forces
 381 operating globally. Seabasing capitalizes on the maritime dominance gained by our nation's
 382 forces, and uses the maneuver space and freedom of action afforded by the sea to stage, project
 383 and sustain joint combat power from an inherently mobile aggregation of distributed and
 384 networked platforms.

385 The US cannot predict with any certainty the political agreements that will be required to
 386 conduct operations in support of its security interests. Nevertheless, our military will be required
 387 to maintain a significant presence in critical regions outside its homeland in order to pursue
 388 national interests. Presence capitalizes on opportunities to engage with government, military,
 389 and other representatives from other countries. Seabasing forces complement the presence
 390 provided by forces based on land near or within an objective area. Forces at sea and present in
 391 the critical regions can close to objective areas and facilitate the at-sea closure of other forces
 392 from distant bases outside those objective areas.

393

394 **3.2 Synopsis of the Central Idea.** Seabasing provides commanders with greater flexibility to
395 rapidly and effectively build and integrate joint capabilities during the early stages of operations
396 with minimal or no access to nearby land bases. When the political situation restricts or denies
397 basing, overflight or US presence, Seabasing leverages flexible forward presence to provide
398 early availability of joint combat power to exploit unpredictable points of entry, even in austere
399 environments. It enables joint force access and enhances power projection by complementing
400 existing basing. Seabasing offers the COCOM and JFC additional options to close, assemble,
401 employ and sustain a joint force. It also complements, integrates and enables joint military
402 capabilities throughout the littorals. Exploiting opportunities created by maritime superiority and
403 the sovereign freedom of forces operating from international waters, Seabasing allows JFCs to
404 expand the joint operations' maneuver space into the sea. Through the protection provided by
405 maneuvering platforms under a defensive power projection shield, Seabasing provides the
406 opportunity to retain a myriad of support functions (sustainment, fire support, medical, and
407 maintenance, etc.) at sea and reduces the need for the build-up of a large vulnerable support
408 infrastructure ashore, particularly during the early stages of combat operations. Seabasing also
409 restricts the adversary's intelligence collection efforts by closing and assembling portions of the
410 joint force at sea.

411 The foundation of Seabasing is the sea base, an inherently maneuverable, scalable
412 aggregation of distributed, networked platforms and organizations, capable of receiving
413 deploying forces and supporting the employment of those forces. Depending on the capabilities
414 of assigned sea base platforms, this support could include the full range of C2, combat support
415 and combat service support functions. The capacity and capability of the sea base could increase
416 over time as more platforms arrive in the operating area. The sea base is organized as a
417 networked entity with interdependent capabilities.

418 Joint forces rapidly deploy and close by a combination of means to the sea base, or points in
419 the objective area, where they organize for operations and from which they receive protection,
420 C2, combat support, and combat service support. These forces then project combat power ashore
421 from the sea base, exploiting the operational freedom of action that maritime superiority
422 provides. The sea base continues to support those forces during operations ashore.

423 Joint forces deploy directly from Continental United States (CONUS)/Outside CONUS
424 (OCONUS) or through secure advanced bases to the sea base using high-speed inter and intra-
425 theater connectors (air/surface) where they join forward deployed and pre-positioned assets.

426 Some aviation forces may self-deploy. The platforms of the sea base might already be in place
427 or might be closing on the designated location simultaneously with deploying forces. Some
428 deploying forces could link up with sea base platforms while enroute to the objective area. The
429 joint forces assemble and organize at the sea base. Combinations of surface and air connector
430 systems transfer assets among the platforms of the sea base as the force organizes for its mission.
431 These connector assets could be forward deployed or deployed to the theater.

432 Sea-based and global assets perform integrated force protection. The sea-based portion of
433 that protection is provided by assets organic to the sea base. These forces include surface
434 combatants, submarines, aircraft, and air and missile defenses as well as assets organic to forces
435 assembling at the sea base.

436 The sea base provides C2 capabilities for the JFC, designated component and multinational
437 staffs. This capability includes seamless C2 of forces throughout the battlespace.

438 Selected combat support for operations ashore originate from the sea base; examples include
439 Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR), Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Special
440 Operations, Naval Fire Support (NFS), and Offensive Air Support (OAS).

441 Forces maneuver from the sea base to operational depths ashore using a combination of air
442 and surface means in austere environments. These could include the same means originally used
443 to deploy those forces to the sea base or by means specifically intended for employment of forces
444 from the sea base. Depending on the situation, forces may continue to operate from the sea base,
445 operating ashore only long enough to perform specific missions before returning to the sea base.
446 As forces flow ashore, additional forces may deploy to the sea base as part of a continuous build-
447 up of combat power. Seabasing operations may open additional early entry points for rapid
448 continued build-up of forces ashore directly from CONUS/OCONUS locations, advanced bases,
449 or intermediate staging bases. Theater access enablers⁷ may provide entry forces with the means
450 to mitigate the limitations brought about by the environment, weather, infrastructure, terrain, and
451 enemy occupation.

452 From the initiation of operations, Seabasing provides persistent joint logistics integrated with
453 operations to ensure the continuous sustainment of select forces afloat and ashore. Seabasing
454 capabilities that support projection and sustainment of joint combat power can also be used to
455 recover, reconstitute and redeploy select joint forces for further employment.

⁷ Theater Access Enablers include US Army Theater Opening Packages, US Air Force Contingency Response Groups and US Navy NMCB and NAVELSF.

456 From the period prior to the onset of a crisis through the completion of stabilization
457 operations, Seabasing provides scalable power projection options to the JFC through the
458 sequential and concurrent integration of the five primary Seabasing lines of operation outlined
459 below. These lines of operation provide a framework for the range of capabilities available to
460 the JFC through Seabasing and are described as:

- 461 • **Close** – rapid closure of joint force capabilities to an area of crisis.
- 462 • **Assemble** – seamless integration of scalable joint force capabilities on and around
463 secure sea-based assets.
- 464 • **Employ** – flexible employment of joint force capabilities to meet mission objectives
465 supported from the sea base.
- 466 • **Sustain** – persistent sustainment of selected joint forces afloat and ashore, through
467 transition to decisive combat operations ashore.
- 468 • **Reconstitute** – the capability to rapidly recover, reconstitute and redeploy joint combat
469 capabilities within and around the maneuverable sea base for subsequent operations.

470 Figure 3-2 depicts an overarching Operational View of these joint Seabasing lines of operation.

471




Figure 3-2 Seabasing Overarching View

471
 472 **3.3 Principles of Seabasing.** Seabasing presents options to the JFC that complement the use of
 473 land bases in the JOA, and maximize advantages to exploit adversary weaknesses. This includes
 474 the rapid employment of joint forces across the spectrum of conflict to deter or disrupt an
 475 adversary's hostile course of action and seize the initiative from the adversary before he can fully
 476 integrate an anti-access strategy. Furthermore, Seabasing supports the transition to decisive
 477 operations by establishing conditions for an early favorable conclusion and closing the gap
 478 between early entry and follow-on forces.

479 There are seven overarching Seabasing principles that apply across a wide range of
 480 scenarios:

- 481 • **Use the sea as maneuver space.** Seabasing exploits the freedom of the high seas to
 482 conduct operational maneuver in the maritime (to include littoral) environment relatively
 483 unconstrained by political and diplomatic restrictions, for rapid deployment and

484 immediate employment. Sea-based operations provide JFCs with an operational
485 flexibility to support the immediate deployment/employment/sustainment of forces across
486 the extended depth and breadth of the battlespace.

- 487 • **Leverage forward presence and joint interdependence.** Joint forces operating from
488 the sea base, in conjunction with other globally based joint forces; provide the JFC an on-
489 scene, credible offensive and defensive capability during the early stages of a crisis.
490 Combined with other elements of this joint interdependent force, forward deployed joint
491 forces can help to deter or preclude a crisis or enable the subsequent introduction of
492 additional forces, equipment, and sustainment.
- 493 • **Protect joint force operations.** Seabasing provides a large measure of inherent force
494 protection derived from its freedom of operational maneuver in a maritime environment.
495 The combined capabilities of joint platforms in multiple mediums (surface, sub-surface,
496 and air) provide the joint forces a defensive shield both at sea and ashore. The
497 integration of these capabilities and freedom of maneuver effectively degrades the
498 enemy's ability to successfully target and engage friendly forces while facilitating joint
499 force deployment, employment, and sustainment.
- 500 • **Provide scalable, responsive joint power projection.** Forces rapidly closing the sea
501 base by multi-dimensional means (air, surface, and subsurface) give the JFC the ability to
502 rapidly scale and tailor forces/capabilities to the mission. Seabasing provides an option
503 to the JFC to mass, disperse, or project joint combat power throughout the battlespace at
504 the desired time to influence, deter, contain, or defeat an adversary.
- 505 • **Sustain joint force operations from the sea.** Sea-based logistics entails sustaining
506 forces through an increasingly anticipatory and responsive logistics system to support
507 forces afloat and select joint/multinational forces operating ashore. The sea base is
508 sustained through the interface with support bases and strategic logistics pipelines
509 enabling joint forces to remain on station, where needed, for extended periods of time.
510 Seabasing uses selective off-load to assemble and deliver tailored sustainment packages
511 directly to joint forces operating ashore.
- 512 • **Expand access options and reduce dependence on land bases.** Seabasing integrates
513 global and sea-based power projection capabilities to provide the JFC with multiple
514 access options to complement forward basing in the JOA, and reduces reliance on
515 forward basing when the security environment dictates. This includes theater access
516 capabilities at improved and unimproved ports and airfields.

- 517 • **Create uncertainty for adversaries.** Seabasing places an adversary in a dilemma
518 through the conduct of dispersed and distributed operations. The options of multiple
519 points and means of entry require an adversary to either disperse or concentrate his
520 forces, creating opportunities to exploit seams and gaps in defenses.

521

522 **3.4 Application of Concept within a Campaign.** Seabasing is a flexible and scalable concept
523 that supports a wide range of military operations, including an MCO. The scalable and
524 distributed nature of Seabasing provides the JFC with a means to escalate or deescalate a
525 conflict, through the application of military pressure when and where required, independent of
526 coalition basing. Employing Seabasing, joint forces can assemble and integrate combat
527 capabilities in-theater without necessarily exacerbating or prematurely escalating a crisis. The
528 JFC will use Seabasing to rapidly build, integrate, and project combat power from over-the-
529 horizon with distributed and net-centric forces to seize the initiative. These actions, when
530 coupled with joint forcible entry, enable a rapid transition to decisive operations. This sets the
531 conditions for the joint force to achieve deployment momentum and the projection of joint
532 combat power to operational depths within the JOA. In this context, Seabasing provides the JFC
533 options to conduct JFEO (seize multiple entry points – e.g., improved and unimproved Aerial
534 Port of Debarkation (APOD)/Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD), objectives, etc.) for faster
535 transition to decisive operations. This overall capability will be made possible by high-speed
536 inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface)⁸ that are able to operate over-the-shore or through
537 unimproved, shallow water or austere ports for near simultaneous reinforcement of immediate
538 response forces to enable the JFC to apply expanded maneuver options throughout the JOA. The
539 JFC will leverage these capabilities to close the gap between immediate response and rapid
540 response forces in order to move as quickly as possible from efforts to seize the initiative to
541 decisive operations, without an operational pause.

542 Concurrently, air/space assets provide unique capabilities to complement and enable
543 maritime-based operations. Global Strike forces may project power within minutes or hours, and
544 can provide air, space, sea, and limited ground operations to achieve initial effects while the sea
545 base is being established. Global air/space assets, in conjunction with sea-based assets, will
546 conduct integrated operations to defeat anti-access threats, assisting in assuring access and

⁸ Examples of high-speed inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface) include, but are not limited to, Rapid Strategic Lift Ship (RSLs), Austere Access High Speed Sealift (AAHSS), and Joint Heavy Lift Aircraft (JHLA).

547 setting the conditions for follow-on operations. Long-range combat air forces/tankers/C4ISR
548 systems will conduct operations in conjunction with ground and maritime forces to achieve
549 desired effects and meet JFC objectives.

550 At the conclusion of a campaign, Seabasing will serve the JFC with the means to provide
551 secure staging and redeployment of forces back to CONUS/OCONUS bases and other
552 designated areas. Inter and intra-theater lift (air/surface) will be used to interface with the sea
553 base and other points ashore to recover and transport personnel and equipment. The sea base can
554 be scaled to provide continued support during the latter phases of the campaign, including
555 security, transition, and reconstruction operations.

556 The same Seabasing benefits inherent in conducting an MCO also apply to a wide range of
557 contingency operations (Annex D examines Seabasing applications in an MCO (SDTE and Pre-
558 emptive), HA and COIN). The JFC has the option to use Seabasing to complement land-based
559 operations or conduct the majority of operations from the sea.

560

561 **3.5 Operational Context.** The following describes Seabasing within the operational context of
562 the functional capability of Joint C2, the phases of an MCO and the Seabasing Lines of
563 Operation (LOO). This section provides a broad, overarching discussion on the operational
564 application of Seabasing. Specific operational descriptions are described in the detailed
565 illustrative CONOPS in Annex D.

566

567 **3.5.1 Joint C2.** The sea base provides the capability for the JFC to exercise command and
568 control of joint and multinational forces. C2 can be conducted afloat, enroute, or ashore, as the
569 commander deems appropriate. The command element operating afloat reduces support and
570 force protection requirements ashore, thereby making more resources available to those elements
571 conducting, or directly supporting operations. Should the commander desire to do so, he will
572 have the capability to command from a small, highly mobile forward command post while the
573 major portion of the staff remains afloat. If sustained operations ashore develop, the commander
574 will have the capability to fully transition C2 capabilities and functions from the sea base.

575 Regardless of whether C2 is conducted from afloat, ashore, or various collective locations, it
576 is supported by a common net-centric C2 system. The system is inherently joint and
577 interoperable with select multinational systems. It is secure, scalable to meet mission

578 requirements, easily deployable, and capable of supporting commander collaboration
579 requirements.

580 Joint Seabasing C2 structure may leverage existing Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ),
581 potentially embarking part of a core element to conduct effects based planning, and rapidly
582 prepare for an operation by using tools such as the Collaborative Information Environment (CIE)
583 and Operational Net Assessment (ONA).

584 The JFC may designate functional component commanders (Joint Force Land Component
585 Commander (JFLCC), Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), Joint Force Air
586 Component Commander (JFACC), and Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)), or service
587 component commanders, or a combination of the two to plan, coordinate and execute operations
588 under their cognizance. The location and size of the JFC's headquarters element, the
589 components and their staffs during Seabasing operations are important because they potentially
590 influence key capabilities in the sea base (e.g., C2, berthing, etc.). Assuming functional
591 componency is utilized and given the requirements for a seamless transition between immediate
592 and rapid response forces, this JIC envisions that the JFC (to include selected portions of his
593 staff), JFMCC, JFLCC, JSOTF, and other designated component/multinational staff elements
594 may be embarked in the sea base in accordance with the JFC's intent. JFACC may embark an
595 Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) as his direct representative in the sea base to
596 liaison with the JFC, and component/multinational staffs.

597

598 **3.5.2 Deter/Engage.** By taking advantage of rapid closure and assembly of immediate and rapid
599 response forces, Seabasing provides the JFC multiple methods to deter an adversary, or conduct
600 selected operations, to include demonstrations, Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs), and Non-
601 Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). During these operations, high-speed inter and intra-
602 theater connectors (air/surface) provide the required capacity, rate and accessibility, which
603 includes the use of improved and unimproved APODs/SPODs.

604

605 **3.5.2.1 Close.** Strategic Planning Guidance outlines the overall military strategy for the future,
606 including specified response timelines. Seabasing follows this guidance by providing and
607 supporting immediate response, rapid response and follow-on forces in the required timelines.
608 This concept provides the JFC with several options to conduct operations that range from

609 deterrence with immediate response forces to decisive operations with rapid response and
610 follow-on forces.

611 Immediate response forces (generally forward deployed, presence, or alert forces) are
612 envisioned to include forward deployed naval assets (e.g., Carrier Strike Groups (CSG),
613 SSGNs/SOF, and Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG)), specified Army Brigade Combat Teams
614 (BCT) (e.g., Airborne, and when forward deployed/based, Air Assault (AASLT), Stryker, etc.),
615 Air Force Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force (AETF) elements (including ISR, Global
616 Strike, Airlift, Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR), CSAR, and space assets), and special
617 operations/multinational/interagency forces. These forces will be able to immediately respond to
618 conflicts by rapidly closing the JOA, deterring the enemy, and if necessary, seizing the initiative
619 through the use of joint combat power. Immediate response forces will self-deploy or use high-
620 speed inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface) to close the JOA and the sea base.

621 Rapid response forces (generally, tailored joint forces configured to respond shortly after the
622 employment of immediate forces) are envisioned to include designated and pre-positioned assets
623 in theater, OCONUS, and CONUS. Examples include Marine Expeditionary Brigade(s) (MEB),
624 Maritime Pre-positioning Ship (MPS) Squadron(s)/Groups (MPS/MPG)(MPG to include
625 Combat Logistics Fleet (CLF)), Army Strategic Flotilla (ASF), additional Army BCTs/Unit(s) of
626 Employment (UEX) and additional CSG/ESGs, special operations capable forces, follow-on
627 AETF elements, and selected multinational/interagency forces. Rapid response forces will either
628 self-deploy or use high-speed inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface) to advanced bases,
629 and in some cases, directly close to the sea base. On arrival at advanced bases, selected forces
630 will use high-speed intra-theater connectors (air/surface) to close to the JOA and/or sea base.

631 The importance of high-speed inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface) cannot be
632 overemphasized – these assets must provide rapid, long endurance, high capacity means of
633 movement of joint personnel and equipment from advanced bases to distributed, unpredictable,
634 austere locations within the JOA.

635 High-speed intra-theater connectors (air/surface) may also ferry forces and equipment from
636 advanced bases to sea base prime movers enroute to the JOA. These same intra-theater
637 connectors also provide critical transportation between sea base assets within the JOA –
638 transportation is required to assemble, integrate, and sustain at-sea joint forces.

639 Closure must not be limited to sequential force flow – increased responsiveness for follow-on
640 forces will be gained by enabling force projection through multiple, parallel force flows. This

641 will generate increased throughput and balanced deployment momentum that further enables
642 rapid transition to decisive operations. As follow-on forces are introduced, they may:

- 643 • Deploy from CONUS/OCONUS for employment directly to objectives ashore
- 644 • Deploy through the sea base for employment to objectives ashore
- 645 • Deploy to advanced bases or intermediate staging bases (ISBs), then employ to objectives
646 ashore
- 647 • Deploy to the sea base for subsequent operations

648 The sea base may also act as an afloat ISB providing logistics support and force protection to
649 forces employing on or from the sea base.

650 While closing to the JOA, the JFC, along with subordinate commanders, will conduct
651 collaborative preparation and planning to include course of action development, virtual or live
652 rehearsals, and simulations⁹. Through the net-centric environment, the JFC will receive
653 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) updates and use ONA to develop situational
654 awareness. This process requires a layered and survivable ISR plan that includes air/space,
655 maritime and reconnaissance forces from the various services. In addition, the JFC may initiate
656 an aggressive Information Operations (IO) campaign throughout the battlespace. This IO
657 campaign should address the impact of the sea base, including its presence and capabilities, on
658 the adversary's decision-making and actions. Robust Joint Battle Management Command and
659 Control (JBMC2) capabilities, facilitated by the net-centric environment, are essential to this
660 process to provide the Common Operational Tactical Picture (COTP) and Situational Awareness
661 (SA).

662

663 **3.5.2.2 Assemble.** Regardless of the mode of deployment to the JOA and sea base, an essential
664 capability is the seamless integration of joint maritime, air and land capabilities to support joint
665 power projection. The sea base must provide facilities to conduct at-sea arrival, reception, and
666 assembly of arriving joint forces through sea state 4. It is envisioned that forces and equipment
667 arriving at the sea base via high speed inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface) will be
668 transferred to prime movers, which will have the capability to handle a full range of cargo,
669 equipment, supplies, and personnel. Interfaces between prime movers and high-speed inter and
670 intra-theater connectors (air/surface) must support the transfer of joint forces and equipment

⁹ Live rehearsals are always the preferred method for preparing for tactical employment of forces from the sea base. Virtual rehearsal at the tactical level is an alternative method when the commander deems sufficient time is not available for a live force rehearsal. At a minimum, systems checks must be accomplished prior to employment.

671 through sea state 4. At a minimum, this future capability will require materiel handling systems,
672 platform interface capability for trans-loading, and sea state mitigation capabilities.

673 In order to provide sea base mobility and persistence, the following focus areas must be
674 addressed: external payload transfer; joint modular intermodal packaging; internal payload
675 transfer; and broken stow.

676 External payload transfer can be further broken down into large and small vessel interfaces
677 (lift-on / lift-off and roll-on / roll-off). Large vessel interfaces will provide the ability to rapidly
678 and safely transfer and secure materiel and vehicles by stabilized cranes, standard tensioned
679 replenishment alongside methods, or by transferring rolling stock between sealift, sustainment
680 and/or sea base prime movers. Small to large vessel at-sea transfer technologies will be
681 developed to enable the transfer of materiel and equipment from or to the sea base prime movers
682 to or from small vessels such as the high speed connectors for intra-theater transfer. These
683 technologies will allow ships to approach and safely remain connected while at sea in the sea
684 base.

685 Advanced joint intermodal modular packaging techniques will improve handling and reduce
686 retrograde, waste, and storage requirements. Efforts such as the Joint Modular Intermodal
687 Container (JMIC) are looking to develop a pallet-sized intermodal ISO¹⁰ module or container
688 that is compatible with multiple distribution platforms. The size of the modules is a critical
689 feature but will be difficult to determine until the attributes and features of the modules are
690 decided.

691 Shipboard internal payload movement systems must incorporate seamless transitions and be
692 “throughput-matched.” Vertical and horizontal cargo movement rate must match to make it
693 possible for stowage at the rate of receipt during underway replenishment. Internal payload
694 transfer capabilities to eliminate bottlenecks inherent in elevator platform loading and unloading
695 during conventional strike-up/strike-down operations will be needed. Another internal payload
696 and transfer capability is the automated warehouse system that maximizes cargo throughput,
697 selectivity, packing density, availability, and reliability, while minimizing cost, weight, and
698 maintenance. Finally, to achieve increased Seabasing throughput rates, advancements in
699 shipboard internal materiel handling must occur that will enable very large loads (cargo and
700 weapons) to be moved more quickly and safely by fewer personnel in higher sea states.

¹⁰ ISO is an acronym for the International Organization for Standardization and is derived from the Greek “Isos”, meaning, “equal.”

701 The broken stow factor¹¹ will fluctuate depending on the type and size of vehicles, type and
702 size of general cargo, experience of loading personnel, type of loading, method of stowage, and
703 configuration of the compartment. To support selective offload capability, broken stow must be
704 taken into account when designing and employing platforms that support the at-sea arrival and
705 assembly of combat cargo, equipment and personnel. Broken stow factor must account for both
706 the turning radius of combat vehicles and the tailored packaging of Class I (food) and V
707 (explosives) materiel.

708

709 **3.5.3 Seize the Initiative.** The JFC seizes the initiative through the integrated application of
710 joint force capabilities to gain, expand, and maintain access. The very presence of the sea base
711 in the JOA provides a measure of access, particularly when basing or host nation support is not
712 available. The sea base provides the infrastructure to conduct anti-denial operations, including
713 maritime, aviation, and special operations. These operations include Global Strike with land-
714 based air, space, maritime, and multinational assets employed from CONUS/OCONUS and the
715 sea base. JUSS will provide freedom of maritime maneuver through Mine Countermeasures
716 (MCM) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) operations. Joint IAMD operations counter
717 adversary air and missile threats.

718 The JFC will continue to conduct ISR, IPB and IO, increasing battlespace awareness,
719 supporting combat operations, and achieving desired effects. To set the conditions for forcible
720 entry, the JFC will conduct Joint Advance Force Operations (JAFO), which may include
721 reconnaissance of objective areas/assault lanes/high value targets, raids, direct action operations,
722 etc.

723 Conducting forcible entry operations, the JFC uses maneuver from the sea to create multiple
724 dilemmas for the adversary, compelling the adversary to concentrate or disperse forces. For
725 example, one of the primary Seabasing missions within an MCO may be to seize multiple entry
726 points (e.g., improved and unimproved APODs and SPODs) for use by follow-on forces for
727 faster transition to decisive operations. To accomplish this, the JFC will use Seabasing
728 operations to integrate and synchronize immediate, rapid response and follow-on forces,
729 configured to conduct a combination vertical and surface maneuver. As the introduction of
730 advanced lift improves depth of operations, future forces can be used to either strike directly at
731 the enemy or to secure air and sea entry points for follow-on forces. Once entry is achieved, the

¹¹ Broken stow factor is a percentage of space that is invariably lost between boxes, vehicles, around stanchions and

732 JFC will seek to maintain deployment momentum by means of simultaneous and sequential force
733 flows through these multiple entry points, thus enabling more rapid build-up of combat
734 formations within the JOA. These actions enable the JFC to extend joint combat power of
735 maneuver forces to operational depths.

736

737 **3.5.3.1 Employ.** Leveraging the scalability of the sea base, small units (joint, combined, SOF
738 and/or interagency) may be employed early to conduct sensitive, initial operations. This may
739 occur concurrently with the closure and assembly of additional joint forces, and expansion of the
740 sea base. In addition, SOF planning and C2 elements (Joint Special Operations Task Force) may
741 embark in sea base platforms.

742 The JFC conducts operations to establish maritime superiority and expand maritime access
743 thereby increasing freedom of maneuver unimpeded by the maritime threat. Maritime
744 superiority requires the defense of the sea base from attacks, including defense against
745 submarines as well as multiple small boats and asymmetric terrorist or suicide attacks. It also
746 requires the detection, identification, neutralization and potential clearing of mines to ensure
747 maneuver access in key littoral approaches to be used for follow-on surface assault.

748 Air and space superiority is required through all lines of operation and provides joint forces
749 the freedom to maneuver unimpeded by the air threat. During the employ line of operation, this
750 includes the freedom to maneuver vertically to objectives within the JOA. Air/space superiority
751 includes defending joint Seabasing forces from enemy air and missile attack, including theater
752 ballistic missiles, and the intercept and engagement of enemy aircraft and cruise missiles
753 throughout the JOA. Initially supported by Global Strike (kinetic and non-kinetic), IAMD, and
754 sea-based forces providing tactical air and missile capability against air/space threats, this
755 mission will be expanded to include ground based point and area defense assets to rapidly
756 expand the theater IAMD umbrella.

757 By exploiting the maneuverability of the sea base, the JFC can mitigate anti-access threats,
758 and capitalize on operations in and from the commons without interference (i.e., control of the
759 relevant international sea, air, and cyberspace) to conduct operations at the time and place of his
760 choosing. Localized anti-access threats may effect but not preclude the JFC from conducting
761 offensive operations ashore. Seabasing provides a unique advantage to the JFC by extending the
762 breadth and depth of the battlespace.

763 Seabasing allows the JFC to conduct integrated power projection concurrent with expansion
764 of the sea base and assuring access. This includes the employment of a scalable range of lethal
765 and non-lethal joint force capabilities to support JFC mission objectives. The JFC selects the
766 appropriate interdependent joint force mission packages to achieve desired effects. These
767 packages require access to the net-centric environment at the unit level, while on the move.

768 Integrated power projection includes not only the use of all-weather precision strike
769 throughout the JOA, but also the insertion of ground forces at key objectives selected by the JFC.
770 Seabasing provides freedom of maneuver for these joint forces by using the sea base's mobility
771 and maneuverability to conduct flexible sea-to-objective maneuver and by providing mobile
772 land, air, and sea-based fires. Sea-based fires include strikes on strategic, operational and tactical
773 targets to shape the battlespace, close supporting fires for maneuver forces during the initial
774 entry and during subsequent operations ashore, counter-fire to protect maneuver forces ashore,
775 and suppression of enemy air defenses. Joint fires assets are an integral part of Seabasing, and
776 include OAS from sea-based and theater/global aviation assets, and NFS from ships. Future joint
777 fires must provide the reach, precision, volume, and responsiveness required to support
778 maneuver forces ashore.

779 During integrated combat power projection, the JFC and his components must have the
780 capability to plan, coordinate, execute, and synchronize distributed operations across the
781 battlespace. This includes timely battlespace awareness and actionable intelligence, available to
782 networked and distributed operational and tactical units (including those on the move) – the net-
783 centric environment must support user requirements for secure data and information transfer and
784 provide access to applicable enterprise services to all nodes.

785 Seabasing will also use operations from the sea to create dilemmas for the adversary by
786 exploiting multiple means to seize the initiative and set the conditions for decisive operations.
787 These avenues include the capability to provide tactical connectors (air/surface) to project forces
788 ashore and maneuver forces within the JOA, and then use these tactical lift assets to continually
789 sustain joint ground forces. Joint ground forces, supported by sea-based fires, are more mobile
790 and agile; consequently these joint ground forces have greater freedom to maneuver.

791 Vertical maneuver is a critical Seabasing capability to support operations and sustainment.
792 Vertical maneuver of a mounted force substantially expands the options for the joint force
793 commander to execute distributed operations into austere environments with increased lethality,
794 mobility, and survivability of these forces compared to dismounted troops. By employing
795 vertical maneuver from the sea base, joint mounted forces are able to rapidly expand entry

796 lodgments, respond more effectively to a greater array of enemy threats, move to subsequent
797 objective areas faster and operate to greater depths. Overall, vertical maneuver of joint mounted
798 forces can enable tactical operations to quickly achieve desired effects. Reliance on vertical
799 maneuver, especially low altitude transit of uncontrolled territory separating the sea base and
800 forces distributed throughout the JOA, may require a high degree of persistence and survivability
801 for the ISR and strike forces tasked with suppressing air defenses.

802 For forcible entry operations from the sea, the sea base must be able to project and sustain
803 forces to objectives by simultaneous air and surface means. Seabasing forcible entry includes
804 both projecting brigade sized forces¹² from the sea base via air and surface lift within one period
805 of darkness from OTH to inland objectives and the projection of non-sea-based forces from
806 CONUS, advanced bases or non-theater locations.

807

808 **3.5.3.2 Sustain.** Guided by the COCOM's intent and the complexity of the operation, a scalable
809 set of logistics support capabilities can enable the JFC to synchronize and integrate logistics to
810 sustain Seabasing forces and other support activities across the JOA. The solution set in one
811 COCOM will not necessarily be the same for another. Each has its own unique requirements.
812 While simple enhancements to existing processes and procedures may bring efficiencies in one
813 area, a more robust logistics command and control entity may be required in another. The
814 logistics command and control construct must be flexible to the needs within each COCOM in
815 this complex operating environment that now asks the JTF Commander to receive, stage,
816 integrate and move as well as sustain multiple services and agencies.

817 In a combat operation, the joint logistics distribution pipeline must be established rapidly and
818 concurrent with force closure. Forward deployed and pre-positioned immediate response forces
819 will have established strategic and theater sustainment capabilities. The joint deployment and
820 distribution enterprise will expand existing regional peacetime distribution capabilities to support
821 closure, assembly, sustainment, and reconstitution of rapid response and follow-on forces.

822 The distribution network will employ inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface) to
823 sustain the sea base. The distribution enterprise should focus on the sea base early in the
824 operation as it is likely that, during seize the initiative, SPODs/APODs will be limited. Once lift
825 assets arrive at the sea base, the joint force must expeditiously receive, reconfigure, store, load,
826 transport, and distribute supplies, and materiel throughout the sea base. Decision support tools

¹² See Section 2.4, Assumptions.

827 and total asset visibility will provide the capability to coordinate and control the distribution of
828 joint logistics.

829 Seabasing enables persistent combat operations by sustaining selected joint forces ashore
830 through multiple entry points. Tactical distribution directly from the sea base reduces the need
831 for the build-up of large supply bases ashore. Once joint ground forces have been projected
832 ashore they will be continually sustained by a combination of intra-theater and tactical
833 connectors from the sea base. Seabasing will provide continual sustainment for up to two
834 brigades during initial phases of an operation and support throughput for select follow-on forces.
835 Sustainment ashore includes scalable selective offload, transfer and distribution of personnel,
836 materiel, and all classes of supply from the sea base. Tactical heavy/medium lift (air/surface)
837 from the sea base to forces ashore will ensure the timely distribution of designated classes of
838 supply. In particular, tactical vertical lift can be used to distribute supplies to joint forces without
839 reliance on overland sustainment to reduce joint forces' vulnerability to both conventional and
840 asymmetric threats.

841 Seabasing must support a number of logistics functions to include: designated maintenance
842 of joint force equipment on the sea base, selected maintenance and equipment recovery support
843 ashore, medical evacuation of casualties to the sea base, level III medical services on the sea
844 base, and the evacuation of patients and casualties from the sea base to facilities outside the JOA.
845

846 **3.5.4 Decisive Operations.** Execution of a large-scale operation would likely require the
847 seizure of early entry points and land bases to facilitate the rapid entry of additional joint forces.
848 Seabasing provides a means for the seamless transition to decisive operations by establishing
849 conditions that allow a closing of the gap between initial entry and follow-on forces,
850 transitioning combat power ashore, and withdrawing and repositioning combat power. As entry
851 points are established, the JFC has options of flowing forces through the sea base, flowing
852 directly to available APODs/SPODs from CONUS or advanced bases, or using capabilities
853 provided by both the sea base and by facilities ashore seized by the joint force. During decisive
854 operations, Seabasing offers the option of commanding assigned forces from a secure sea base
855 until choosing to move C2 capabilities and functions ashore.

856

857 **3.5.5 Transition.** During transition, the JFC focuses on coordinating joint force activities to
858 bring operations to a successful conclusion. This includes the assessment of Seabasing
859 operations and the potential transition of selected sea-based joint forces to other missions.

860

861 **3.5.5.1 Reconstitute.** As follow-on forces enter the JOA, or as the operational situation dictates
862 (e.g., transition to stabilization operations or need to project power elsewhere), the JFC may
863 rapidly transition joint sea-based forces to sequential or follow-on operations through at-sea
864 reconstitution. Rapid reconstitution eliminates the need to wait for additional forces or
865 equipment from CONUS to support additional operations in a different location.

866 Once the decision is made to reconstitute, selected forces ashore will recover personnel and
867 equipment to the sea base using tactical connectors (air/surface). Upon recovery to the sea base,
868 joint forces begin the process of restoring selected combat capability. This process is facilitated
869 by the logistics and maintenance capability inherent to the sea base, including sustainment
870 through access to distribution pipelines, intra-ship transfer, and selective on-load/off-load
871 capability.

872 Once selected joint forces have been recovered to the sea base, the JFC has the option of
873 maneuvering and repositioning within the JOA. This repositioning can be done concurrently
874 with the at-sea restoration of joint force combat capability. Once the joint force capability has
875 been reconstituted (i.e., the forces and their equipment have been fully restored), the JFC then
876 has further options to reemploy sea-based forces, including projecting power ashore in the same
877 JOA on another axis of entry, or in another role altogether (e.g., stabilization, peacekeeping,
878 etc.).

879 The JFC has the additional option of rapidly deploying sea-based forces to another JOA.
880 This is advantageous to support responsiveness required by future defense guidance for
881 immediate and rapid response forces. Redeploying the sea-based force allows the COCOM the
882 ability to rapidly reposition and employ a proven joint combat force, i.e., immediate and rapid
883 response forces that have already closed, assembled and integrated. Seabasing provides the
884 responsiveness as directed in defense guidance, to redeploy from one JOA and seize the initiative
885 in another JOA.

886

886 **Section 4 – LINES OF OPERATION, TASKS, ATTRIBUTES, AND STANDARDS AND**
887 **CONDITIONS**

888

889 *“We’ve got to include more of a Joint force in everything we do. We have to become*
890 *fully integrated into Joint warfighting. Our exercises have to be done in a Joint context.*
891 *Our doctrines have to be developed keeping in mind that we’re going to fight as a member*
892 *of a Joint team. We should have in mind that we’re developing the force to contribute to*
893 *the Joint force commander. Our commitment to a capabilities-based Joint force will give*
894 *combatant commanders the right options in the right place at the right time.”*

895

896 *General Kevin P. Byrnes*

897 *Army Training and Doctrine Command*

898

899 **4.1 Lines of Operation.** The five lines of operation used to organize joint Seabasing are:

- 900 • **Close** – rapid closure of joint force capabilities to an area of crisis.
- 901 • **Assemble** – seamless integration of scalable joint force capabilities on and around secure
902 sea-based assets.
- 903 • **Employ** – flexible employment of joint force capability to meet mission objectives
904 supported from the sea base.
- 905 • **Sustain** – persistent sustainment of joint forces afloat and ashore, through transition to
906 decisive combat operations ashore.
- 907 • **Reconstitute** – capability to rapidly recover, reconstitute and redeploy joint combat
908 capability within and around the maneuverable sea base for subsequent operations.

909

910 **4.2 Attributes.** Attributes provide the framework to establish measures of effectiveness for tasks
911 identified in Annex C. They support the CBA and serve as a common foundation for follow-on
912 assessment.

- 913 • **Infrastructure** – the measure of a family of systems and capabilities that provide
914 essential services toward accomplishing the mission. It describes the physical plant,
915 facilities, systems, services, manpower, and skill sets required to support Seabasing
916 operations (i.e., receive, assemble, store, integrate, project, transfer, support, and sustain a
917 designated quantity of the joint force). Infrastructure is a critical cornerstone of
918 Seabasing operations. It supports the functional requirements of joint force operations,

919 e.g., the movement of selected forces and equipment (by air and sea), berthing,
920 equipment storage, net-centric environment, C2 capabilities, logistics (supply,
921 sustainment and maintenance), rehabilitation, medical care, etc. The components of
922 infrastructure are generally fixed sets of systems and capabilities that provide essential
923 services, but can be configured to adapt to various mission packages.

- 924 • **Capacity** – describes the maximum degree to which Seabasing operations are able to
925 receive, store, organize, integrate, project, support, and sustain a designated quantity of
926 the joint force. It is a key attribute as it determines to some extent the size and the ability
927 of the JFC to conduct Seabasing operations. Capacity describes the limits of joint force
928 capabilities that can be supported from the sea base and is driven in large part by the
929 functional limitations of the Seabasing infrastructure (i.e., volume, weight, radio
930 frequency spectrum and associated bandwidth, workstations, skill sets, maintenance
931 capability, etc.). Seabasing operations are scalable; the infrastructure can be configured
932 to fit the force. Therefore capacity need not be a limiting factor, but must be planned for
933 when employing a joint force from a sea base.
- 934 • **Rate** – describes the degree to which Seabasing operations are able to receive, store,
935 organize, integrate, project, support, and sustain a designated quantity of the joint force
936 over a period of time under a standard set of conditions. Since speed and responsiveness
937 are essential elements of successful joint operations, maximizing the rate of Seabasing
938 capabilities for closure, assembly, employment, sustainment, and reconstitution must be
939 addressed. The rate of the joint force that flows during Seabasing operations will be
940 driven in large part by the functional limitations of Seabasing capacity and infrastructure
941 (e.g., aircraft sortie generation rate and surface throughput rate as driven by
942 embarkation/debarkation points (air and surface), speed of off-load/on-
943 load/staging/integration/rehabilitation, etc.). The maximum rate that can be supported by
944 a given infrastructure is normally fixed. To increase rate, infrastructure must be changed.
- 945 • **Interoperability** – describes the degree to which Seabasing operations are able to
946 provide and accept assets and services from other units, systems, and forces, and to
947 operate these exchanged assets and services together in an effective manner. Joint
948 Seabasing forces must be able to seamlessly operate with joint and multinational forces.
949 Seabasing infrastructure should be designed to accommodate US and other forces and
950 still operate effectively at a sustained rate. Future joint standards may need to be
951 developed to address key interfaces to ensure interoperability.

- 952 • **Survivability** – describes the degree to which Seabasing operations can mitigate effects
953 of actions that threaten the sea base and designated forces ashore. Survivability depends
954 on several factors, including the specific numbers and type of threat, acceptable level of
955 risk determined by the commander, protective measures, training, inherent defensive
956 capabilities of the sea base and joint force infrastructure vulnerability to damage or
957 susceptibility to attack. It also includes the capability of Seabasing operations to conduct
958 protection, including the functions of detect, assess, warn, defend, and recover.
- 959 • **Accessibility** – characterizes the ability of Seabasing operations to project joint force
960 capabilities throughout a range of changing environmental conditions. The flexibility to
961 bypass or operate within the physical constraints presented by terrain, hydrography,
962 weather, depth of operations, and threat is an important attribute of Seabasing operations.
963 Seabasing must be supportable both day and night, during fair weather or poor.
964 Furthermore, Seabasing maneuver elements must be capable of conducting operations
965 across different types of terrain and coastal boundaries in austere conditions to safely
966 deliver combat forces, supplies and materiel to achieve objectives at varying ranges of
967 operations. A variety of both surface and air maneuver capabilities supporting Seabasing
968 operations across the spectrum of operational environments may be needed to provide the
969 necessary accessibility.

970

971 **4.3 Conditions and Standards¹³**. The overarching conditions and standards for conducting
972 Seabasing operations are:

- 973 • Project joint combat power from OTH to inland objectives.
- 974 • Conduct operations in all weather, 24/7, through sea state 4.
- 975 • Provide facilities to effect recovery, decontamination, and reconstitution of Chemical,
976 Biological, and Radiation (CBR) contaminated equipment and personnel.
- 977 • Provide multi-dimensional defense of the sea base.
- 978 • Provide C2 of distributed joint and multinational and coordinate with interagency forces.
- 979 • Provide scalability to enable the JFC to achieve deployment momentum and joint
980 objectives across a range of military operations.
- 981 • Provide Joint Logistics Enterprise to sustain joint, multinational and interagency forces.
- 982 • Contribute to joint logistics management.

¹³ Specific tasks, conditions and standards are identified in Annex C.

- 983 • Contribute to joint total asset and in-transit visibility.
- 984 • Employ standardized intermodal packaging across the services.
- 985 • Employ standardized trans-modal interfaces to/at/from the sea base.
- 986 • Integrate relevant intelligence activities (including adversary capabilities, disposition and
- 987 intention) in support of the sea base.
- 988

988 **Section 5 – IMPLICATIONS**

989

990 *"We need to think about Seabasing in a very joint construct and what it does for*
991 *the entire military structure, and we need to figure out how to invest properly, focus our*
992 *investment stream so we maximize that advantage."*

993

994 *Admiral Clark, Chief of Naval Operations*

995 *Air Force Magazine, July 2004*

996

997 **5.1 Implications for National Security.** Our nation's security and continued prosperity is
998 highly dependent on international cooperation and trade. However, it has become more difficult
999 to precisely predict the worldwide political, social, and security environments in which our
1000 nation's interests must be preserved. We have traditionally provided forward deployed US
1001 military force presence to influence regional security, to promote democracy, to respond to
1002 crises, and to safeguard US interests. However, the changing character of the threats to
1003 international security and peace are more frequently requiring that US military forces conduct
1004 operations in areas where host nation support and international cooperation cannot be
1005 guaranteed. Our inability to accurately predict future security risks and the uncertainty of
1006 continued global partnerships highlights the need for flexible, agile, and sovereign forces that
1007 can operate independently, if necessary, to secure US interests. Future Seabasing capabilities
1008 have great potential to support the successful synchronization, projection and sustainment of a
1009 full range of joint force capabilities in non-permissive environments where host nation
1010 cooperation is uncertain or unattainable. Seabasing provides the President and/or the Secretary
1011 of Defense with feasible, sustainable options for projecting joint military capabilities in many
1012 parts of the world without having to rely on forward land bases or assurance of international
1013 cooperation. Joint Seabasing when sufficiently implemented will fulfill an increasingly vital role
1014 for joint military operations well into the 21st century.

1015

1016 **5.2 Implications for JCIDS and Acquisition.** The ultimate objective of joint concepts is to
1017 guide the transformation of the joint force so that it is prepared to operate successfully in the next
1018 10-20 years. JICs such as Seabasing have been developed to describe future joint force
1019 capabilities to support Capabilities Based Assessments (CBAs) that will ultimately impact future
1020 joint force employment and development. Joint CBAs will shape near-term programming

1021 decisions and science and technology investment, and support the development of far-term
1022 capability roadmaps.¹⁴ The following capability requirements are highlighted to help focus
1023 assessments and guide development:

- 1024 • C2 of joint, multinational and multi-agency Seabasing operations requires net-centric
1025 systems to be interoperable, use common data standards and formats, and support
1026 connectivity between widely dispersed units operating OTH beyond line of sight.
- 1027 • Seabasing operations call for the development of specific concepts of employment for
1028 pre-positioning and amphibious ship hulls, high-speed strategic shipping, and joint high-
1029 speed vessels in Seabasing scenarios, with particular attention as to how hull forms will
1030 interact and operate to accomplish required operations.
- 1031 • Force Protection and survivability of the sea base and sea-based systems is necessary to
1032 support the concept. In particular, efforts should focus on the ability to counter threats
1033 related to ASUW, MIW, IAMD, and ASW.
- 1034 • The distributed nature of Seabasing operations and the desire to synchronize the effects
1035 of dispersed, highly maneuverable forces increases the requirement for persistent, reliable
1036 situational awareness down to the unit level, including the need to identify and track
1037 friendly, enemy, neutral, and unknown contacts.
- 1038 • Seabasing operations call for the capability to provide on-demand, timely, tailored, user-
1039 defined intelligence to widely dispersed, moving forces airborne, afloat and ashore.
- 1040 • A family of connector platforms supporting high-speed inter and intra-theater/tactical
1041 connectors (air/surface) will facilitate Seabasing operations to project and sustain joint
1042 forces operating within and from the sea base. This means potential future development
1043 of maritime and air vehicles that can operate in austere conditions in other than fixed
1044 ports and airfields, and can support the capacity, accessibility, and rates required to
1045 rapidly deploy and sustain joint force capabilities in forward operating areas where secure
1046 support bases may not be in close proximity to the JOA.
- 1047 • Seabasing operations are highly dependent on the close coordination and synchronization
1048 of joint and multinational capabilities to provide supporting fires. Fire support
1049 coordination must be able to support converging, distributed joint/multinational force
1050 employment over extended operational and strategic distances. Fires supporting
1051 Seabasing operations must provide sufficient effects, precision, range and quantity to

¹⁴ Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan, July 2004

1052 support maneuver of widely dispersed forces operating over extended distances. Joint C2
1053 must support the coordination and deconfliction of joint and multinational fires
1054 throughout the JOA.

- 1055 • One of the primary advantages of Seabasing operations is the maneuverability provided
1056 the JFC. To take full advantage of joint Seabasing capabilities, the JFC must be able to
1057 conduct joint shaping operations and synchronize effects. Establishment of net-centric
1058 enabled, sea-based C2 and ISR among joint and multinational forces is essential to
1059 shaping operations and will allow the JFC to successfully employ globally distributed
1060 (forward based and CONUS) combat power to neutralize enemy activities and to achieve
1061 desired effects.
- 1062 • Distributed operations from the sea base call for a joint logistics system that is more
1063 interoperable and provides for greater connectivity, integration, and centralization.
1064 Added commonality of parts and materiel will facilitate joint logistics support.
- 1065 • Seabasing operations will be highly dependent upon total asset visibility during transit
1066 to/from the sea base, within the sea base, and when transferring and supporting selected
1067 joint forces ashore. Total asset and in-transit visibility will allow the JFC to more
1068 effectively tailor joint force packages and provide necessary sustainment and logistics
1069 support within the sea base and to joint/multinational forces operating ashore.
- 1070 • Seabasing projection and sustainment will be highly dependent on at-sea transfer systems
1071 that facilitate the movement and distributions of personnel, equipment, and supplies
1072 between platforms and from ship-to-shore. Additionally, systems that provide for added
1073 maneuverability and storage within the sea base will be crucial to supporting joint force
1074 assembly and staging.

1075

1076 **5.3 Implications for Joint Experimentation.** “Joint experimentation explores concepts to
1077 identify joint and component DOTMLPF change recommendations and capabilities needs.
1078 Experimentation provides insight and understanding of the concepts and capabilities that are
1079 possible given the maturity of specific technologies and capabilities that need additional research
1080 and development emphasis.”¹⁵ Experimentation includes: seminars, war games, exercises,
1081 prototype development, and analysis (e.g., CBA). The following areas are recommended for

¹⁵ CJCSI 3170.01E, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, 11 May 2005

1082 future Joint and Service exercises and experimentation: Unified Quest, Unified Course, Sea
1083 Viking, Sea Trial, Unified Engagement, etc.

- 1084
- 1085 • To support sea-based C2 and joint shaping operations, sea-based C2 and ISR
1086 experimentation should focus on providing a net-centric environment to facilitate
1087 interoperability and situational awareness enabling joint and multinational collaborative
1088 planning, rehearsal, execution, and assessment among widely dispersed, on-the-move,
1089 units. Emphasis should be placed on supporting real-time situational awareness down to
1090 a specified tactical unit/platform level to include providing friendly force tracking.
 - 1091 • To enable the rapid deployment and assembly, and persistent sustainment of joint force
1092 capabilities within the sea base and JOA, sea base connector experimentation should
1093 focus on developing inter-theater, intra-theater, and tactical connectors that can
1094 effectively interface with platforms comprising the sea base.
 - 1095 • C2 experimentation supporting joint and multinational fires should focus on the timely
1096 coordination, integration, synchronization, and deconfliction of fires and strikes.
1097 Emphasis should be placed on determining the capabilities of the sea base to support
1098 pertinent planning and operations.
 - 1099 • Fires experimentation should concentrate on the effective synchronization of joint and
1100 multinational fires to achieve effects and to provide needed volume, range, and precision
1101 to support a range of combat operations ashore. Emphasis should be placed on
1102 determining the capabilities of the sea base to support a variety of supporting fires for
1103 units operating ashore at different distances from the sea base.
 - 1104 • Experimentation for joint logistics should focus on a goal of interoperable, distribution-
1105 based logistics. This includes systems that support total asset and in-transit visibility of
1106 joint and multinational forces, equipment and supplies; at-sea delivery and transfer
1107 systems that facilitate the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies to, within,
1108 and from sea base platforms; selective on-load/off-load of personnel, equipment and
1109 supplies; and integrated logistics planning and execution.

1110

- 1110 **ANNEX A – Reference Documents**
1111
1112 **A. National Security Strategy, September 2002**
- 1113 **B. National Defense Strategy, March 2005**
- 1114 **C. National Military Strategy, 2004**
1115
- 1116 **D. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 30 September 2001**
1117
- 1118 **E. CJCSINST 3170.01E Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)**
1119
- 1120 **F. Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS)**
1121
- 1122 **G. Baseline Security Posture (BSP)**
1123
- 1124 **H. Multi-Scenario Force Deployment (MSFD)**
1125
- 1126 **I. Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan, July 2004**
1127
- 1128 **J. Joint Operations Concept (JOpsC), November 2003**
1129
- 1130 **K. Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept (MCO JOC), 24 March 2004**
1131
- 1132 **L. Force Application Functional Concept, February 2003**
1133
- 1134 **M. Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, December 2003**
1135
- 1136 **N. Joint Command and Control Functional Concept, February 2004**
1137
- 1138 **O. Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concept, April 2005**
1139
- 1140 **P. Protection Joint Functional Concept, 31 December 2003**
1141
- 1142 **Q. Functional Concept for Battlespace Awareness, 31 December 2003**
1143
- 1144 **R. Force Management Joint Functional Concept (draft)**
1145
- 1146 **S. Joint Force Entry Operations (JFEO) Joint Integrating Concept, 15 September 2004**
1147
- 1148 **T. Joint Undersea Superiority (JUSS) Joint Integrating Concept**
1149
- 1150 **U. Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept, 10 January 2005**
1151
- 1152 **V. Integrated Air and Missile Defense Joint Integrating Concept, January 2005**
1153
- 1154 **W. Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept (draft)**
1155
- 1156 **X. Command and Control Joint Integrating Concept (draft)**

1157
1158 **Y. Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Seabasing, August 2003**
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1160 **Z. NWDC/MCCDC Enhanced Networked Seabasing (ENS) Concept Paper, August 2003**
1161
1162 **AA. JFCOM Joint Seabasing Concept of Operations (draft), July 2004**
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1164 **BB. Chief of Naval Operations (N703) Seabasing CONOPS (draft), March 2004**
1165
1166 **CC. High Speed Connectors Enabling Concept, October 2004**
1167
1168 **DD. CJSM 3500.04C Universal Joint Task List, July 2002**
1169
1170 **EE. The Army's Future Force Capstone Concept, 07 April 2005**
1171
1172 **FF. Nimble Viking 04 War game Outbrief, November 2004**
1173
1174 **GG. Oversea Basing Commission Report, 09 May 2005**
1175
1176 **HH. JP-1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, November 2000**
1177
1178 **II. JP 3-18 Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations, July 2001**
1179
1180 **JJ. JP 2-0 Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, March 2000**
1181
1182 **KK. JP 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Amended 09 May 2005**
1183

1183 **ANNEX B – Glossary and Acronyms**

1184

1185 **Accessibility** – the flexibility to bypass or operate within the physical constraints presented by
1186 terrain, hydrography, weather, depth of operations, and threat is an important attribute of
1187 Seabasing operations. Seabasing must be supportable both day and night, during fair weather or
1188 poor, and maneuver elements must be capable of conducting operations across different types of
1189 terrain and coastal boundaries in austere conditions to safely deliver combat forces, supplies, and
1190 materiel to achieve objectives at varying ranges of operations. (Ref: Seabasing JIC)

1191

1192 **Advanced base** – base located in or near an operational area whose primary mission is to
1193 support military operations. (Ref: JP 1-02). Advanced bases can include main operating bases
1194 (MOB), forward operating sites (FOS), and cooperative security locations (CSL). (Ref: National
1195 Defense Strategy 2005)

1196

1197 **Air Assault** – movement of friendly assault forces (combat, combat support, and combat service
1198 support) by rotary-wing aircraft to engage and destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key
1199 terrain. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1200

1201 **Airborne** – troops especially trained to effect, following transport by air, an assault debarkation,
1202 either by parachuting or touchdown. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1203

1204 **Amphibious Force** – amphibious task force and a landing force together with other forces that
1205 are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1206

1207 **Austere Environment** – an operational environment with the following characteristics: little or
1208 no host-nation support; limited pre-existing infrastructure and facilities; immature ports of
1209 debarkation; inadequate transportation and communications networks; unsophisticated medical,
1210 supply and other services. It is a particularly difficult environment for conducting operations of
1211 expeditionary joint forces. Derived to support Seabasing JIC Concept of Operations where little
1212 or no host nation infrastructure is available to support joint military operations. (Ref: Seabasing
1213 JIC)

1214

1215 **Austere Port** – an austere port includes characteristics of degraded and minor ports and has one
1216 or more of the following limitations: loading/discharge capability; cargo handling; pier, quay or
1217 berth facilities (length and/or water depth); and access. Derived to support Seabasing JIC
1218 Concept of Operations where seaport of debarkation has limited capabilities. (Ref: Seabasing
1219 JIC)

1220

1221 **Battlespace Awareness** – the knowledge and understanding of the operational area's
1222 environment, factors, and conditions, to include the status of friendly and adversary forces,
1223 neutrals and noncombatants, weather and terrain, that enables timely, relevant, comprehensive,
1224 and accurate assessments, in order to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and/or
1225 complete the mission. (Ref: JP 1-02). The ability to develop shared situational awareness and to
1226 produce intelligence through persistent and pervasive observation of all domains. It is
1227 knowledge and understanding of all domains. It is the knowledge and understanding of the
1228 operational environment's characteristics and conditions, friendly, adversary and non-combatant
1229 disposition and other natural and man-made effects that enable timely, relevant, comprehensive,
1230 and accurate assessments in support of national and military objectives. (Modified from JP 2-01
1231 dated Oct 2004)

1232

1233 **Capability Based Assessment (CBA)** – the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
1234 System analysis process that includes the functional area, needs and solution analyses and post
1235 independent analysis. The results of the CBA are used to develop a joint or initial capabilities
1236 document. (CJCSI 3170.01E)

1237

1238 **Capacity** – the sea base's maximum capability to receive, store, organize, integrate, forward,
1239 support, and sustain a designated quantity of the joint force. The joint force includes personnel,
1240 their equipment, organic lift (air and surface), organic strike, force protection, intelligence,
1241 information exchange, command and control, and required logistics (supply, sustainment, and
1242 maintenance). The sea base's maximum capacity to handle a joint force that flows into and from
1243 the sea base will be driven in large part by the functional limitations of the sea base infrastructure
1244 (i.e., volume, weight, bandwidth, workstations, skill sets, maintenance capability, etc.). As the
1245 sea base will be scalable – that is to say that the infrastructure can be modified to fit the force –
1246 capacity should not be considered a limiting factor, but used as a planning guideline for a

1247 notional sea base in support joint operations. Derived to support Seabasing JIC attributes,
1248 measures and effectiveness. (Ref: Seabasing JIC)

1249
1250 **Collaborative Information Environment (CIE)** – a specified information environment that
1251 enables collaborative processes at will between a select group of individuals or organizations.
1252 The CIE is a subset of the emerging global information environment. The information backbone
1253 that provides warfighters the ability to enhance organizational effectiveness, and reduce
1254 hierarchical, serial planning timelines through information and idea sharing and parallel
1255 planning. (Ref: Joint Command and Control Joint Functional Concept dated Feb 2004)

1256
1257 **Connector** – a system, usually surface or vertical, that provides a means of movement for joint
1258 forces, equipment, materiel, supplies and parts, between two or more distributed units of the sea
1259 base (in this case units of the sea base may include fixed or unimproved points ashore, including
1260 pier, beach, landing zone, etc.) An inherent characteristic is an interoperable connection (e.g.,
1261 interface) between the units that it connects. Derived to support development of Seabasing JIC
1262 (Ref: Seabasing JIC)

1263
1264 **Counterinsurgency** – Military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic
1265 actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1266
1267 **Deployment Momentum** – a characteristic of a military campaign that seeks to close gaps
1268 between arrival of deployed forces, and eliminate operational pauses caused by the need to
1269 secure lodgments/points of debarkation for follow-on forces. When these gaps are closed,
1270 deployment momentum is achieved, improving the capability of the force to expand initial
1271 operations and build combat power sufficiently to assume the offensive throughout the JOA.
1272 (Ref: Seabasing JIC)

1273
1274 **Distributed Operations** – the conduct of simultaneous non-contiguous operations, distributed
1275 across a JOA in a synchronized manner. (Modified from JOpsC dated November 2003)

1276
1277 **Effects Based Planning (EBP)** – an operational planning process to conduct Effects Based
1278 Operations within RDO. EBP is results-based vice attrition based. EBP closely mirrors the
1279 current joint planning process, yet focuses upon the linkage of actions to effects to objectives.

1280 EBP changes the way we view the enemy, ourselves, and what is included and emphasized in the
1281 planning process. EBP uses a flexibly structured battle rhythm that leverages a collaborative
1282 information environment and capitalizes on the use of fewer formal joint boards. It employs
1283 virtual, near-simultaneous planning at all echelons of command. (Ref: JFCOM Online Glossary
1284 July 2005)

1285

1286 **Expeditionary Force** –An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign
1287 country. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1288

1289 **Flexible Deterrent Option (FDO)** – a planning construct intended to facilitate early decision by
1290 laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin with deterrent-oriented options
1291 carefully tailored to send the right signal. The flexible deterrent option is the means by which the
1292 various deterrent options available to a commander (such as economic, diplomatic, political, and
1293 military measures) are implemented into the planning process. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1294

1295 **Focused Logistics** – building sufficient capacity into the deployment and sustainment pipeline,
1296 exercising sufficient control over the pipeline from end-to-end, and providing a high degree of
1297 certainty to the supported joint force commander that forces, equipment, sustainment, and
1298 support will arrive where needed and on time. (Ref: Focused Logistics JFC dated December
1299 2004)

1300

1301 **Force Application** – the integrated use of maneuver and engagement to create the effects
1302 necessary to achieve assigned mission objectives. (Force Application JFC dated March 2004)

1303

1304 **Forward Operating Base (FOB)** – a base usually located in friendly territory or afloat that is
1305 established to extend command and control or communications or to provide support for training
1306 and tactical operations. Facilities may be established for temporary or longer duration operations
1307 and may include an airfield or an unimproved airstrip, an anchorage, or a pier. (Modified from JP
1308 1-02 to capture air and maritime aspects of a forward operating base)

1309

1310 **Global Strike** – responsive joint operations that strike enemy high value/payoff targets, as an
1311 integral part of joint force operations conducted to gain and maintain battlespace access, achieve

1312 other desired effects and set conditions for follow-on decisive operations to achieve strategic and
1313 operational objectives. (Global Strike JIC dated January 2005)

1314

1315 **Humanitarian Assistance (HA)** – operations conducted to relieve or reduce the results of
1316 natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger,
1317 or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss
1318 of property. Assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host
1319 nation civil authorities or agencies. (Modified from JP 1-02)

1320

1321 **Intermediate Staging Base (ISB)** – a temporary location used to stage forces prior to inserting
1322 the forces into the host nation. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1323

1324 **Infrastructure** – the physical plant, facilities, systems, services, manpower, and skill sets
1325 inherent to the sea base, necessary to receive, assemble, store, integrate, forward, support, and
1326 sustain a designated quantity of the joint force. The joint force includes personnel, their
1327 equipment, organic lift (air and surface), organic strike, force protection, intelligence,
1328 information exchange, command and control capabilities, and required logistics (supply,
1329 sustainment, and maintenance). In general, infrastructure includes facilities, equipment and
1330 personnel to support the functional requirements of the sea base: movement of selected forces
1331 and equipment (including by air and sea), berthing, equipment storage, command and control,
1332 logistics (supply, sustainment and maintenance), rehabilitation, medical care, etc. The
1333 infrastructure is generally a fixed set of systems and capabilities, but can be modularized to adapt
1334 to various mission packages. Derived to support Seabasing JIC attributes, measures and
1335 effectiveness. (Ref: Seabasing JIC)

1336

1337 **Interoperability** – the capability of the sea base infrastructure and joint force to provide and
1338 accept assets and services from other units, systems, and forces, and to operate these exchanged
1339 assets and services together in an effective manner. Specifically, interoperability is the sea base
1340 capability to seamlessly operate with joint and a multinational force, i.e., the sea base
1341 infrastructure is designed to accommodate different forces, equipment, services, and still operate
1342 effectively. Derived to support Seabasing JIC attributes, measures and effectiveness. (Modified
1343 from JP 1-02)

1344

1345 **Joint Advance Force Operations (JAFO)** – military operations conducted within the Joint
1346 Operations Area (JOA) by the Joint Force Commander (JFC) in order to prepare the objective
1347 area for the main assault by forcible entry forces. JAFO may include operations to gain and
1348 maintain local domain dominance. (Ref: JP 3-18 Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations
1349 dated Jul 2001)

1350
1351 **Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise** – the collective set of common and fully
1352 integrated joint processes, standards, systems, platforms, C2, people, organizations, shared-
1353 knowledge, and communication networks established to globally distribute joint personnel,
1354 equipment, materiel, supplies, repair parts and other joint requirements. (Ref: Draft Joint
1355 Logistics (Distribution) JIC)

1356
1357 **Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO)** – Seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face
1358 of armed opposition. (Ref: JP 3-18 Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations dated Jul 2001)
1359

1360 **Joint Interdependence** – the services’ purposeful reliance on each others capabilities to
1361 maximize complementary and reinforcing effects while minimizing relative vulnerabilities in
1362 order to achieve the mission requirements of the JFC. (Ref: Draft Capstone Concept for Joint
1363 Operations (CCJO))

1364
1365 **Joint Integrating Concept (JIC)** – a description of how the Joint Force Commander 10-20
1366 years in the future will integrate capabilities to generate effects and achieve an objective. A JIC
1367 includes an illustrative CONOPS for a specific scenario and a set of distinguishing principles
1368 applicable to a range of scenarios. (Ref: CJCSI 3170.01E Joint Capabilities Integration and
1369 Development System (JCIDS))

1370
1371 **Joint Operations Area (JOA)** – area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic
1372 COCOM or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander conducts military
1373 operations to accomplish a specific mission. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1374
1375 **Joint Operating Concept (JOC)** – an operational-level description of how the Joint Force
1376 Commander 10-20 years in the future will accomplish a strategic objective through the conduct
1377 of operations within a military campaign. The concept identifies broad principles and essential

1378 capabilities and provides operational context for JFC and JIC development and experimentation.
1379 (Ref: CJCSI 3170.01E Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS))

1380

1381 **Joint Total Asset Visibility** – capability designed to consolidate source data from a variety of
1382 joint and Service automated information systems to provide joint force commanders with
1383 visibility over assets in-storage, in process, and in-transit. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1384

1385 **Lines of Operation** – lines that define the directional orientation of the force in time and space
1386 in relationship to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its
1387 objectives. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1388

1389 **Major Combat Operations (MCO)** – large-scale operations conducted against a nation state(s)
1390 that possesses significant regional military capability, with global reach in selected capabilities,
1391 and the will to employ that capability in opposition to or in a manner threatening to US National
1392 Security. (Ref: Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept (MCO JOC) dated September
1393 2004)

1394

1395 **Net-Centric (NC)** – a framework for full human and technical connectivity and interoperability
1396 that allows all DOD users and mission partners to share the information they need, when they
1397 need it, in a form they can understand and act on with confidence, and protects information from
1398 those who should not have it. (Net-Centric Environment JFC dated April 2005)

1399

1400 **Operational Net Assessment (ONA)** – a continuously updated operational support tool that
1401 provides a JTF commander visibility of effects-to-task linkages based on a "system-of-systems"
1402 analysis of a potential adversary's political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and
1403 information (PMESII) war-making capabilities. The ONA informs decision-makers from
1404 strategic to tactical levels regarding the complementary effects and supporting missions and tasks
1405 that can be considered when applying the full range of diplomatic, information, military, and
1406 economic (DIME) actions to achieve specific effects on an adversary's will and capability in
1407 support of national objectives. (Ref: JFCOM Online Glossary July 2005)

1408

1409 **Prime Mover** – the units of the sea base that provide the primary means of movement to/from
1410 and in the JOA, for joint forces, equipment, supplies and parts. Prime movers also provide

1411 infrastructure to support joint forces and their equipment for a designated period of time. Derived
1412 to support description of Seabasing CONOPS. (Ref: Seabasing JIC)

1413
1414 **Rate** – the sea base's maximum capability to receive, store, organize, integrate, forward, support
1415 and sustain, a designated quantity of the joint force over a period of time under a standard set of
1416 conditions. The joint force includes personnel, their equipment, organic lift (air and surface),
1417 organic strike, force protection, intelligence, information exchange, command and control, and
1418 the required logistics (supply, sustainment, and maintenance). The rate of the joint force that
1419 flow into and from the sea base will be driven in large part by the functional limitations of the
1420 sea base capacity and infrastructure (i.e., aircraft sortie generation rate and surface throughput
1421 rate as driven by embarkation/debarkation points (air, surface), speed of offload / on load /
1422 staging / integration / rehabilitation, baud rate, information processing speed, etc.). Rate is not
1423 normally scalable – that is to say physical infrastructure cannot be modified to support an
1424 increase in rate. Derived to support Seabasing JIC attributes, measures and effectiveness. (Ref:
1425 Seabasing JIC)

1426
1427 **Reconstitute** – those actions that the JFC plans and implements to restore units to a desired level
1428 of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources.
1429 Reconstitution operations include retrograde and regeneration. Derived to support development
1430 of Seabasing Lines of Operation. (Modified from JP 3-35 Joint Deployment and Redeployment
1431 Operations)

1432
1433 **Reduced Operational Status** – Applies to the Military Sealift Command ships withdrawn from
1434 full operational status (FOS) because of decreased operational requirements. A ship in reduced
1435 operational status is crewed in accordance with shipboard maintenance and possible future
1436 operational requirements, with crew size predetermined contractually. The condition of readiness
1437 in terms of calendar days required to attain FOS is designated by the numeral following the
1438 acronym ROS (i.e., ROS-5). (Ref: JP 1-02)

1439
1440 **Sea Base** – the sea base of the future will be an inherently maneuverable, scalable aggregation of
1441 distributed, networked platforms that enable the global power projection of offensive and
1442 defensive forces from the sea, and includes the ability to assemble, equip, project, support, and

1443 sustain those forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area. Derived to
 1444 support synopsis of central idea and CONOPS. (Ref: Seabasing JIC)

1445
 1446 **Sea State** – a scale that categorizes the force of progressively higher seas by wave height. In
 1447 accordance with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and Joint Meteorology and
 1448 Oceanography (METOC) Conceptual Data Model (JMCDM), sea state is the code that denotes
 1449 the roughness of the surface of the sea in terms of average wave height. (Ref: Joint Metrology
 1450 and Oceanography Conceptual Data Model)

1451		
1452	0 – CALM, GLASSY	WAVE HEIGHT = 0 METERS
1453	1 – CALM, RIPPLED	WAVE HEIGHT = 0 – 0.1 METERS
1454	2 – SMOOTH, WAVELETS	WAVE HEIGHT = 0.1 – 0.5 METERS
1455	3 – SLIGHT	WAVE HEIGHT = 0.5 – 1.25 METERS
1456	4 – MODERATE	WAVE HEIGHT = 1.25 – 2.5 METERS
1457	5 – ROUGH	WAVE HEIGHT = 2.5 – 4.0 METERS
1458	6 – VERY ROUGH	WAVE HEIGHT = 4.0 METERS – 6.0 METERS
1459	7 – HIGH	WAVE HEIGHT = 6.0 METERS – 9.0 METERS
1460	8 – VERY HIGH	WAVE HEIGHT = 9.0 – 14.0 METERS
1461	9 – PHENOMENAL	WAVE HEIGHT = OVER 14.0 METERS

1462
 1463 **Seabasing** – the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-
 1464 employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support,
 1465 sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land
 1466 bases within the JOA. These capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate
 1467 assured access and entry from the sea. (Ref: Approved at JCS Tank June 2004)

1468
 1469 **Self-synchronization** – the ability of a well-informed force to organize and synchronize
 1470 complex warfare activities from the bottom up. The organizing principles are unity of effort,
 1471 clearly articulated commander's intent, and carefully crafted rules of engagement. Self-
 1472 synchronization is enabled by a high level of knowledge of one's own forces, enemy forces, and
 1473 all appropriate elements of the operating environment. It overcomes the loss of combat power
 1474 inherent in top-down command directed synchronization characteristic of more conventional
 1475 doctrine and converts combat from a step function to a high-speed continuum. (Ref: Network-
 1476 Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future, VADM Arthur Cebrowski, Proceedings, January 1998)

1477
 1478 **Seize the Initiative** – assuming offensive actions to confuse, demoralize, disrupt and defeat the
 1479 enemy. Using knowledge superiority to achieve military advantage over the enemy. (Ref: Joint
 1480 Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (JP-1) dated November 2000)

1481
1482 **Survivability** – the sea base's capabilities to protect the joint force embarked in the sea base (and
1483 designated Area of Responsibility (AOR)), and continue accomplishment of the mission, under a
1484 standard set of conditions and against a designated threat. The joint force includes personnel,
1485 their equipment, organic lift (air and surface), organic strike, force protection, intelligence,
1486 information exchange, command and control, and required logistics (supply, sustainment, and
1487 maintenance). The degree of survivability depends on several factors, including the specific
1488 numbers and type of threat, level of risk determined by the Commander, protective measures,
1489 training, and the inherent defensive capabilities of the sea base. Derived to support Seabasing
1490 JIC attributes, measures and effectiveness. (Ref: Seabasing JIC)

1491
1492 **Unit of Employment (UEX)** – is the primary higher tactical echelon of Army forces. The UEx
1493 will be a completely modular command and control entity designed to exercise command and
1494 control over assigned brigades and battalions. The UEx will not have any organic forces beyond
1495 the elements that make up the headquarters. The UEx may be inserted above another UEx or
1496 current force division headquarters as a land component headquarters. This capability allows the
1497 Army to provide the Geographic Combatant Commander (RCC) with the necessary land
1498 command and control to direct major combat operations involving Army, Marine, and
1499 multinational formations. (Ref: Draft Army White Paper on UE operations)

1500

1500
1501**LIST OF ACRONYMS**

AAHSS	Austere Access High Speed Ship
AAR	Air-to-Air Refueling
AASLT	Air Assault
ABL	Airborne Laser
Abn	Airborne
ACA	Airspace Control Authority
ACCE	Air Component Coordination Element
ACE	Aviation Combat Element
AD	Air Defense
AETF	Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force
AF	Amphibious Force
AFFOR	US Air Forces
AFSB	Afloat Forward Staging Base
ALOC	Air Line of Communication
AMEMBASSY	American Embassy
AO	Area of Operation
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APOD	Aerial Port of Debarkation
APOE	Aerial Port of Embarkation
APS	Army Pre-Positioned Stocks
ARFOR	US Army Forces
ARPAC	US Army Forces, Pacific
ASDS	Advanced SEAL Delivery System
ASF	Army Strategic Flotilla
ASW	Anti-Sub. Warfare
ATF	Amphibious Task Force
Atk Avn	Attack Aviation
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BA	Battlespace Awareness
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
Bde	Brigade
BE	Bomber Element
BLT	Battalion Landing Team
Bn	Battalion
BSP	Baseline Security Posture
C2	Command and Control
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CBA	Capability Based Assessment
CBR	Chemical, Biological, and Radiological
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirements
CCOI	Critical Contacts of Interest
CDCM	Coastal Defense Cruise Missile
CE	Command Element
CFACC	Combined Forces Air Component Commander
CFLCC	Combined Force Land Component Commander
CFMCC	Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander
CG	Commanding General
CHAPGRU	Cargo Handling and Port Group
CIE	Collaborative Information Environment
CJFACC	Combined Joint Force Air Component Commander
CJFC	Combined Joint Force Commander
CJFLCC	Combined Joint Force Land Component Commander
CJFMCC	Combined Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
CJIATF	Combined Joint Interagency Task Force
CJIOCC	Combined Joint Information Operations Component Commander
CLF	Combat Logistics Fleet
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
COA	Course of Action
COCOM	Combatant Command
COIN	Counterinsurgency Operations
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
COMSOF	Commander, Special Operations Forces
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CONUS	Continental United States
COTP	Common Operational Tactical Picture
CP	Command Post
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRG	Contingency Response Group
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
CSG	Carrier Strike Group
CSOCC	Combined Special Operations Component Commander
CSSE	Combat Service Support Element
CTF	Combined Task Force
CVOA	Carrier Operating Area
DCA	Defensive Counter Air

D-E-S	Deployment – Employment – Sustainment
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Days of Supply
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DPS	Defense Planning Scenario
DRAT	Disaster Relief Assessment Teams
DSB	Defense Science Board
EEFI	Essential Elements of Friendly Information
EMP	Electro-Magnetic Pulse
EO/IR	Electro-Optic/Infrared
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ESF	Expeditionary Strike Force
ESG	Expeditionary Strike Group
EUCOM	US European Command
EW	Electronic Warfare
FA	Force Application
FARP	Forward Arming and Refueling Point
FCS	Future Combat System
FDO	Flexible Deterrent Option
FEU	Forty-Foot Equivalent Unit
FIE	Flow-In-Echelon
FIOP	Family of Integrated Operational Pictures
FL	Focused Logistics
FM	Force Management
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FON	Freedom of Navigation
FP	Force Protection
FS	Fighter Squadron
FW	Fixed Wing
GCE	Ground Combat Element
GS	Global Strike
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
HALO	High Altitude Low Opening
HNS	Host Nation Support
HPT	High Payoff Target
HQ	Headquarters

HRO	Humanitarian Relief Organizations
HSS	High Speed Sealift
HSV	High Speed Vessel
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
HVT	High Value Target
I&W	Indications and Warning
IAMD	Integrated Air and Missile Defense
IAW	In accordance with
ICD	Initial Capabilities Document
ID	Identification
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IHA	In-extremis Hostage Rescue
ILP	Integrated Landing Platform
IMA	Intermediate Maintenance Activity
IO	Information Operations
IO/ISR	Information Operations/Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
ISB	Intermediate Staging Base
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JAFO	Joint Advance Force Operations
JBMC2	Joint Battle Management Command and Control
JCDRP	Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan
JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFCOM	US Joint Forces Command
JFEO	Joint Forcible Entry Operations
JFLCC	Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC	Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JHLA	Joint Heavy Lift Aircraft
JHSV	Joint High Speed Vessel
JIC	Joint Integrating Concept
JIL	Joint Integrated Logistics
JL	Joint Logistics
JLD	Joint Logistics Distribution
JMCC	Joint Movement Control Center
JMCDM	Joint METOC Conceptual Data Model
JMIC	Joint Modular Intermodal Container
JOA	Joint Operations Area

JOC	Joint Operating Concept
JOpsC	Joint Operations Concept
JRCC	Joint Reception Coordination Center
JSF	Joint Strike Fighter
JSOA	Joint Special Operations Area
JSOAC	Joint Special Operations Air Component
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSTARS	Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTF-HA	Joint Task Force – Humanitarian Assistance
JUSS	Joint Undersea Superiority
LCAC	Landing Craft Air Cushion
LCS	Littoral Combat Ship
LOC	Line of Communication
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MANPADS	Man Portable Air Defense System
MARCENT	US Marine Corps Forces, Central Command
MARFOR	US Marine Corps Forces
MARFORPAC	US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific Command
MCCDC	Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCM	Mine Countermeasures
MCO	Major Combat Operations
MDSU	Mobile Dive and Salvage Unit
ME	Maneuver Enhancement
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
METOC	Meteorology and Oceanography
METT-T	Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available – Time Available
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MHE	Materiel Handling Equipment
MIO	Maritime Interdiction Operations
MMA	Maritime Multi-Mission Aircraft
MOG	Maximum on the Ground
MP	Military Police
MPA	Maritime Patrol Aircraft
MPF(F)	Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future)
MPG	Maritime Pre-positioning Group
mph	miles per hour
MPS	Maritime Pre-positioning Ships

MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSFD	Multi-Service Force Deployment
NAVCENT	US Navy Forces, Central Command
NAVELSF	Naval Expeditionary Logistics Support Force
NAVFOR	US Navy Forces
NAVPAC	US Navy Forces, Pacific Command
NC	Net-centric
NEHC	Navy Environmental Health Center
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
NFS	Naval Fire Support
NGO	Non Government Organizations
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NIPRNET	Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network
nm	nautical mile
NMCB	Navy Military Construction Battalion
NMT	No more than
NOC	Naval Operating Concept
NSE	Naval Support Element
NSFS	Naval Surface Fire Support
NSWTG	Navy Special Warfare Task Group
NTA	Naval Tactical Task
NWDC	Naval Warfare Development Command
OA 04	Operational Availability 2004
OAS	Offensive Air Support
OCONUS	Outside Continental United States
ONA	Operational Net Assessment
OP	Operational Task
OPCON	Operational Control
OPDS(F)	Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (Future)
OPSEC	Operational Security
OTH	Over-the-Horizon
OTM	On-the-Move
PACAF	Pacific Air Force
POD	Point of Debarkation
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PVO	Private Volunteer Organizations
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RCC	Regional Combatant Commander
RGR	Ranger

RHIB	Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat
ROS	Reduced Operational Status
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
RSTA	Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition
RW	Rotary Wing
SA	Situational Awareness
SAG	Surface Action Group
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SAR	Search and Rescue
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SDTE	Swiftly Defeat the Effort
SF	Special Forces
SFOD A	Special Forces Operational Detachment A
SIAP	Single Integrated Air Picture
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SIPRNET	Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SLOC	Sea Line of Communication
SOA	Southern Operating Area
SOCOM	US Special Operations Command
SOC PAC	Special Operations Command, Pacific
SO F	Special Operations Force
SOFA	Standard Operating Force Agreement
SP MAGTF	Special Purpose Marine Aviation Ground Task Force
SPG	Strategic Planning Guidance
SPOD	Sea Port of Debarkation
SPOE	Sea Port of Embarkation
SS	Sea State
SSBM	Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSN	Nuclear Attack Submarine
STANAG	Standing NATO Agreement
STK	Stryker
STRATAIR	Strategic Airlift
STRATCOM	US Strategic Command
SUW	Surface Warfare
TA	Tactical Task
TAC CP	Tactical Command Post
T-ARS	Auxiliary Rescue and Salvage Ship
TATF	Technical Assistance Task Force

TBMD	Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
TCA	Transformational Communication Architecture
TEU	Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit
TF	Task Force
TLAM	Tactical Land Attack Missile
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
TR	Tilt Rotor
TRANSCOM	US Transportation Command
TRAP	Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and/or Personnel
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UA	Unit of Action
UAV	Unmanned Air Vehicle
UEx	Unit of Employment (Division)
UEy	Unit of Employment (Corps)
UJTL	Universal Joint Task List
UN	United Nations
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	US Central Command
USPACOM	US Pacific Command
USW	Undersea Warfare
VISA	Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
VTC	Video Teleconferencing
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
ZMI	Zone of Military Isolation

ANNEX C
LINES OF OPERATION, ASSOCIATED TASKS, ATTRIBUTES,
STANDARDS AND CONDITIONS

C.1 INTRODUCTION.

Seabasing capabilities and associated tasks are based on information contained in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), the Naval Operational Concept, the Joint Logistics (Distribution) JIC, the C2 JIC, the IAMD JIC, the JFEO JIC, the Joint Undersea Superiority JIC, and the Global Strike JIC, and have been organized into tables¹⁶ using the five overarching lines of operation.

- **CLOSE** – the rapid closure of joint force capability to an area of crisis
- **ASSEMBLE** – seamless integration of scalable joint force capabilities on and around secure sea-based assets
- **EMPLOY** – flexible employment of joint force capabilities to meet mission objectives supported from the sea base
- **SUSTAIN** – persistent sustainment of selected joint forces afloat and ashore, through transition to decisive combat operations ashore
- **RECONSTITUTE** – the capability to rapidly recover, reconstitute and redeploy joint combat capabilities within and around the maneuverable sea base for subsequent operations

To assist in identifying general standards, conditions, measures of effectiveness and measures of performance that could be used in assessing Seabasing capabilities and tasks, the following attributes have been defined and used in the tables of this Annex:

- **INFRASTRUCTURE** – the physical requirements and facilities needed to support and sustain joint force capability
- **CAPACITY** – the measure of how much joint force capability can be supported
- **RATE** – how fast things can be accomplished to support joint force capability over a given time under standard sets of conditions
- **INTEROPERABILITY** – the degree to which Seabasing can seamlessly integrate and support joint force capability

¹⁶ Seabasing lines of operation, associated tasks, attributes, standards and conditions for Annex C are located in an associated Excel spreadsheet named Seabasing JIC Annex C Rev 15.xls. This spreadsheet is best viewed when printed on 11 X 17 paper.

- 1534 • **SURVIVABILITY** – the degree to which Seabasing can protect joint force capabilities
- 1535 • **ACCESSIBILITY** – the flexibility to bypass or operate within the physical constraints
- 1536 presented by terrain, hydrography, weather, depth of operations, and threat
- 1537

Note: Metrics used in defining Standards and Conditions were taken from other documents (e.g. ICDs, JICs, etc), or were derived from the development of the Illustrative CONOP – Annex D. Identified metrics are not intended to be definitive or binding, but are intended only as guides to give a range of values to assist in future capabilities based assessments.

1538
1539

1540
1541

1542 The following general definitions are applicable:

1543

DEFINITIONS

LINES OF OPERATION	Lines that define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives .
CAPABILITY	The ability to achieve an effect to a standard under specified conditions through multiple combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks .
ATTRIBUTE	A testable or measurable characteristic that describes an aspect of a system or capability
METRIC	A quantitative measure associated with an attribute .
TASK	An action or activity based upon doctrine, standard procedures, mission analysis or concepts that may be assigned to an individual or organization.
CONDITION	A variable of the environment that affects performance of a task .
STANDARD	The minimum proficiency required in the performance of a task . For mission-essential tasks of joint forces, each task standard is defined by the joint force commander and consists of a measure and criterion .
MEASURE	Quantitative or qualitative basis for describing the quality of task performance.
MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE	Measures designed to quantify the degree of perfection in accomplishing functions or tasks .
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS	Measures designed to correspond to accomplishment of mission objectives and achievement of desired effects .

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548 **ANNEX D. Illustrative CONOPS**

1549

1550 **Executive Summary.** The requirement for the United States to maintain global freedom of
1551 action is a consistent theme throughout the National Security Strategy, National Defense
1552 Strategy, and the National Military Strategy. Seabasing consists of a flexible and scalable set of
1553 capabilities required to support a full range of future military operations, ranging from presence
1554 and deterrence through stability operations.

1555

1556 A notional Seabasing CONOPS is outlined in the unclassified main body of the JIC, with the
1557 primary purpose of identifying critical Seabasing capabilities and tasks in an unclassified
1558 medium, outside of the context of an operational scenario. This annex illustrates detailed
1559 Seabasing CONOPS¹⁷ for the following scenarios¹⁸:

1560

- 1561 • **Appendix 1:** MCO-1 SDTE 2012¹⁹.
- 1562 • **Appendix 2:** MCO-1 Preemptive 2012
- 1563 • **Appendix 3:** Defense Planning Scenarios Illustrative Baseline Security Postures (BSP
1564 #12) for 2012 Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief Operations.
- 1565 • **Appendix 4:** Defense Planning Scenarios Illustrative Baseline Security Postures (BSP
1566 #18) for 2012 Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN).
- 1567 • **Appendix 5:** Supporting Data and Assumptions.

1568

1569 These CONOPS are addressed in separate classified appendices, with the intent that CONOPS
1570 for additional scenarios can be added later to expand the portfolio. Future CONOPS should be
1571 based on approved Defense Planning Scenarios.

1572

1573 CONOPS and capabilities that are specific to a complementary JIC (IAMD, JUSS, JFEO, Global
1574 Strike, C2 and Joint Logistics (Distribution)) are not discussed in detail within this Annex;
1575 however, where necessary, these CONOPS discuss the relationship of these JICs to Seabasing.

1576

1577 Each CONOPS develops Commander's Intent and Planning Guidance, shapes a baseline Course
1578 of Action (COA), and then traces the five Seabasing lines of operation (Close, Assemble,
1579 Employ, Sustain and Reconstitute) and supporting tasks through the applicable phases of the

¹⁷ The scope of these CONOPS will be limited to Seabasing. It is understood that the actual COCOM's CONPLAN for each scenario will be much larger in scope and extend beyond Seabasing operations.

¹⁸ HA and COIN scenarios are conducted near-simultaneously with either MCO-1 SDTE or MCO-1 Preemptive.

1580 campaign. Where applicable, branches will be identified to fully explore Seabasing capabilities.
1581 At the end of each CONOPS, preliminary findings and insights are presented.

1582

1583 The following overarching assumptions are common to all CONOPS discussed in this Annex²⁰:

1584

1585 • US Army Unit of Action/Employment Forces will be operationally capable and deployable

1586 • US Air Force AETF forces will be operationally capable and deployable.

1587 • USMC Baseline 2015 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) will be operationally capable
1588 and deployable.

1589 • By 2015, use of globally sourced forces, along with evolving Flexible Deterrent Options
1590 (FDO), will affect deployment timelines and permit the COCOM(s) more flexibility.

1591 • Capability to support Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) from forward
1592 deployed sea-based platforms will be operationally capable and deployable.

1593 • Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Support Concepts will be operationally capable and
1594 deployable.

1595 • The following future Seabasing systems, platforms and capabilities are available²¹:

1596 ○ Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future)

1597 ○ Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB)

1598 ○ High-Speed Inter-Theater Connector (Air/Surface)

1599 ○ High-Speed Intra-Theater Connector (Air/Surface)

1600 ○ Selective Onload/Offload

1601 ○ Inter-Ship Trans-load through sea state 4

1602 ○ Total Asset Visibility/In-transit Visibility

1603 ○ Intermodal Packaging

1604 ○ Net-Centric Operational Environment (OTM/OTH) communications,

1605 Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) and Enroute Collaborative
1606 Planning)

1607

1608 Annex D Appendix 5 includes background information (e.g., forces, force flow, platforms, etc.)
1609 that can support follow-on analyses, assessment, wargaming, and experimentation.

¹⁹ Incorporating insights from joint Seabasing wargame Nimble Viking 04

²⁰ Unique assumptions for a specific CONOPS are discussed in the applicable appendix.

²¹ Programs are listed for illustrative purposes only. Notional capabilities are listed in Appendix 5.

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